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ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY 
Russell D. Covey 
INTRODUCTION 
Jailhouse snitch testimony is arguably the single most unreliable 
type of evidence currently used in criminal trials.  Snitches are deeply 
unreliable witnesses.  Many are con artists, congenital liars, and 
practiced fraudsters.  As compensated witnesses, all snitches have 
deep conflicts of interest.  What is worse, jailhouse snitch testimony 
as a class is not only the least credible type of evidence, but it is also 
among the most persuasive to jurors because jailhouse informants 
typically allege to have personally heard defendants confess their 
guilt to the crimes charged.  Introduction of a defendant’s confession, 
from any source, radically changes the complexion of a case, 
particularly one lacking other evidence that directly implicates the 
defendant in the crime.  Research studies demonstrate that jurors are 
simply ill equipped to evaluate the credibility of jailhouse informant 
testimony and consistently give such testimony far more weight than 
is due even if they are aware of the incentives jailhouse snitches 
receive or expect in exchange for their testimony.  The prejudicial 
effect of unreliable jailhouse snitch testimony is magnified by the 
context in which the evidence is presented to the jury.  Jailhouse 
snitches are States’ witnesses, and the credibility of their testimony 
is likely substantially bolstered as a result.  Prosecutors bolster 
jailhouse snitch testimony simply by putting them on the witness 
stand as state witnesses, signaling to the jury that the prosecutor 
believes their testimony is trustworthy.  Even in cases in which 
bolstering crosses the line into the territory of the unethical or 
improper, and it often does, prosecutors are rarely called out for their 
misconduct, much less face sanctions.  As a result of both implicit and 
explicit prosecutorial bolstering, jailhouse snitch testimony tends to 
have an even greater, and potentially more prejudicial, effect on 
reliable fact-finding. 
Jailhouse snitch testimony, in fact, is so likely to make a material 
difference to the outcome of close cases, and so likely to be false, that 
permitting such witnesses to testify, absent direct corroboration 
 
 Professor of Law, Georgia State University.  Thanks to Caren Morrison 
for her comments on earlier drafts of the article, to Pam Brannon and the 
research library staff for their diligent research support, and to the GSU 
College of Law for financial support for this project. 
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through electronic recording or some other similarly reliable method, 
should be flatly banned.  Numerous commentators have proposed 
modest fixes to the jailhouse snitch problem.  Some have urged the 
conduct of pretrial reliability hearings.  Others have argued for 
enhanced disclosure obligations regarding informant background and 
testimony.  Still other fixes have been proposed.  But given the depth 
to which jailhouse testimony is compromised, these modest proposals 
are simply inadequate.  Anything less than total abolition of jailhouse 
snitch testimony is fundamentally insufficient to address what is 
perhaps the most outrageous and destructive prosecutorial practice 
currently tolerated by law. 
This Article lays out that argument.  Following this introduction, 
Part I demonstrates that jailhouse informant testimony is inherently 
biased and that the temptations faced by inmates to commit perjury 
are overwhelming.  Part II explains why jailhouse snitch testimony is 
so persuasive to jurors, and why it is responsible for a 
disproportionate number of wrongful convictions.  Part III examines 
the present devices relied upon to filter out unreliable informant 
testimony—cross-examination and postconviction review—and finds 
them wanting.  Neither device has a successful track record of 
providing relief to wrongfully convicted defendants nor offers any 
realistic mechanism to screen out unreliable snitch testimony.  Part 
IV considers several remedies proposed by commentators and enacted 
in a few jurisdictions.  These remedies, if adopted, might marginally 
improve the situation in some cases, but all of these remedies 
ultimately fail to address the fundamental problems of unreliability 
and unaccountability that are inherent to this class of evidence.  Part 
V then advances the main thesis of the Article, urging adoption of a 
total ban on jailhouse informant testimony, subject only to a possible 
exception for testimony corroborated with electronic recording of any 
alleged confession or admission made by a criminal defendant.  It 
assesses the grounds for such a ban by examining other categorical 
evidentiary exclusions enforced through judicial, legislative, or 
executive action. 
 
I. JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY IS FUNDAMENTALLY AND 
PERVASIVELY UNRELIABLE 
 
Exoneration studies have identified a set of recurrent causes of 
wrongful convictions, including false confessions, mistaken 
eyewitness testimony, and faulty forensic evidence.1  However, no 
evidence is more intrinsically untrustworthy than the allegations of 
 
1. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 8–9 (2011); Samuel R. Gross et al., 
Exonerations in the U.S., 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542–44 (2005). 
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a jailhouse snitch.2  According to some wrongful conviction scholars, 
jailhouse snitch testimony is the single greatest cause of wrongful 
convictions.3  This should not be surprising.  It is hard to imagine 
more facially untrustworthy evidence.  One federal court 
characterized the practice of using jailhouse snitches as “one of the 
most abused aspects of the criminal justice system,”4 another as a 
“fertile field[] from which truth-bending or even perjury could grow,”5 
and a third called jailhouse snitch testimony “inherently unreliable.”6  
In an address intended as advice for prosecutors, federal judge 
Stephen Trott warned prosecutors not to trust criminal informants: 
 
Criminals are likely to say and do almost anything to 
get what they want, especially when what they want 
is to get out of trouble with the law.  This willingness 
 
2. See, e.g., THE JUSTICE PROJECT, Jailhouse Snitch Testimony: A Policy 
Review, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 1 (2007), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustso
rg/reports/death_penalty_reform/Jailhouse20snitch20testimony20policy
20briefpdf.pdf (stating that “snitch testimony is widely regarded as the 
least reliable testimony encountered in the criminal justice system”); see 
also Brief of the NACDL as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 
2, Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (2009) (No. 07-1356), 2008 WL 
5409458 [hereinafter Brief of the NACDL] (“a jailhouse snitch’s 
uncorroborated claim that the defendant confessed to him . . . is 
notoriously unreliable.”).  Similarly, a state court has cautioned that 
“[c]ourts should be exceedingly leery of jailhouse informants, especially 
if there is a hint that the informant received some sort of a benefit for his 
or her testimony.”  Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 783 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2000). 
3. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice 
in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 57 (1987) (reporting 
that jailhouse informants testified falsely in 117 of the 350 wrongful 
convictions studied).  Other exoneration studies have identified 
eyewitness misidentifications and false confessions as factors in a greater 
number of known wrongful convictions.  GARRETT, supra note 1.  Even if 
mistaken eyewitness testimony and false confessions have led to a 
greater absolute number of known wrongful convictions, there is little 
doubt that false jailhouse snitch testimony occurs with greater frequency 
than mistaken eyewitness identifications or false confessions.  While 
eyewitness testimony and defendant confessions are two of the most 
common types of evidence used in criminal prosecutions, snitch 
testimony appears in a quantitatively smaller subset of cases.  
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE 
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 6 (2009).  Nonetheless, it still manages to 
account for a sizeable number of documented wrongful convictions.  
Bedau & Radelet, supra. 
4. Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462, 470 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Jana Winograde, Comment, Jailhouse Informants and the Need for 
Judicial Use Immunity in Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 
755, 756 (1990)). 
5. United States. v. Levenite, 277 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2002). 
6. Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 916 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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to do anything includes not only truthfully spilling the 
beans on friends and relatives, but also lying, 
committing perjury, manufacturing evidence, 
soliciting others to corroborate their lies with more 
lies, and double-crossing anyone with whom they come 
into contact, including—and especially—the 
prosecutor.  A drug addict can sell out his mother to 
get a deal, and burglars, robbers, murderers and 
thieves are not far behind.  Criminals are remarkably 
manipulative and skillfully devious.  Many are 
outright conscienceless sociopaths to whom “truth” is 
a wholly meaningless concept.  To some, “conning” 
people is a way of life.  Others are just basically 
unstable people.  A “reliable informer” one day may 
turn into a consummate prevaricator the next.7 
 
Judge Trott warned that, among informants, jailhouse snitches 
are indisputably the worst of the bunch: 
 
The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse 
snitch who claims another prisoner has confessed to 
him.  The snitch now stands ready to testify in return 
for some consideration in his own case.  Sometimes 
these snitches tell the truth, but more often they 
invent testimony and stray details out of the air.8 
 
The practice of using jailhouse snitches in serious criminal cases 
is both pervasive and, as a direct result, a major cause of error in the 
criminal justice system.9  Although it had long been apparent that 
jailhouse snitch testimony was sometimes extremely unreliable, the 
strong link between jailhouse snitches and wrongful convictions has 
only become clear recently thanks to the still-breaking wave of DNA 
exonerations.10  Analysis of the causes of wrongful convictions in 
these cases reveals that jailhouse snitches have been involved in a 
surprisingly large percentage of known wrongful convictions—
twenty-one percent—according to Innocence Project founders Barry 
Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer.11  The Scheck, Neufeld, and 
Dwyer study looked at exonerations resulting from DNA testing, a 
 
7. Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals 
as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1383 (1996). 
8. Id. at 1394. 
9 NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
10 Id. at 7. 
11. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND 
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000). 
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sample that included a disproportionately large percentage of sexual 
assault cases.12 
Jailhouse informants play an even more pernicious role in capital 
cases.13  One criminal defense attorney testified before a Los Angeles 
County grand jury that she had conducted a study of all cases in 
which a California defendant received the death penalty and 
concluded that jailhouse informant testimony was used in 
approximately one-third of those cases.14  According to the 
Northwestern University Law School’s Center on Wrongful 
Convictions, 45.9 percent of documented wrongful convictions in 
capital cases involved testimony by jailhouse informants or by “killers 
with incentives to cast suspicion away from themselves,” making 
“snitches the leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital 
cases.”15  The Commission on Capital Punishment convened by 
former Illinois Governor George Ryan concluded that testimony from 
jailhouse informants appeared to be a major cause of wrongful 
convictions in the cases it looked at involving persons sentenced to 
death in Illinois.16 
 
A. Jailhouse Informants Face Overwhelming Temptations to 
Commit Perjury 
 
Jailhouse snitches testify not out of the goodness of their hearts, 
but to obtain one or more of a variety of incentives typically offered to 
them.  These incentives range from almost trivial benefits, like 
cigarettes, to improved jail conditions and cash payments,17 up to the 
 
12 Id. at 244–46. 
13. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 7. 
14. REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY: 
INVESTIGATION OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 37, available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/jailhouse/expert/1989-
1990%20LA%20County%20Grand%20Jury%20Report.pdf [hereinafter 
GRAND JURY REPORT].  Following release of the Grand Jury Report, the 
L.A. County District Attorney’s Office adopted stringent controls over the 
use of jailhouse snitches and now rarely permits their use at trial.  
NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 189–90. 
15. NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE 
SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER 
INNOCENT AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3 (2004–2005), available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf 
[hereinafter THE SNITCH SYSTEM]. 
16. GEORGE H. RYAN, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 7–8  (2002), available at 
http://illinoismurderindictments.law.northwestern.edu/docs/Illinois_Mo
ratorium_Commission_complete-report.pdf. 
17. Harris County, Texas, has recently begun a program offering 
jailhouse informants up to $5000 for helpful information.  See Renee C. 
Lee, Harris Co. Sheriff Offers Cash for Jailhouse Tipsters, HOUS. CHRON., 
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gold standard of cooperation benefits—release or reduction of jail 
sentences.18  Indeed, testifying against fellow inmates may often 
constitute a prisoner’s only hope of escaping a substantial prison 
term.19  The unscrupulous inmate thus faces powerful temptations to 
serve as a jailhouse snitch.  As the Fifth Circuit has observed, “[i]t is 
difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of 
a reduced sentence.”20  Another court noted that it was “obvious” that 
cooperation premised on promises of leniency or immunity “provide a 
strong inducement to falsify” testimony.21  Even in cases where 
leniency or immunity is not at stake, the prospect of receiving some 
tangible reward for false testimony can be irresistible.  As one 
attorney commented, “[w]hen you dangle extra rewards, furloughs, 
money, their own clothes, stereos, in front of people in overcrowded 
jails, then you have an unacceptable temptation to commit perjury.”22 
Not only are the temptations to manufacture false snitch 
testimony powerful, the difficulty of doing so is minimal.  As a 
Canadian commission created to investigate the causes of one 
wrongful conviction observed, “[i]n-custody confessions are often easy 
to allege and difficult, if not impossible, to disprove.”23  To generate a 
credible confession, a snitch need only learn some basic details about 
a fellow inmate’s case.24  A lying jailhouse snitch might gather 
information about a high profile case simply by reading newspaper 
stories or watching TV broadcasts about the case.25  Snitches can also 
 
Jan. 10, 2011, available at http://www.chron.com/news/houston-
texas/article/Harris-Co-sheriff-offers-cash-for-jailhouse-1623204.php. 
18 Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating 
Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. 
L. REV. 921, 935–36 (2009). 
19. See Carl N. Hammarskjold, Comment, Smokes, Candy, and the 
Bloody Sword: How Classifying Jailhouse Snitch Testimony as Direct, 
Rather Than Circumstantial, Evidence Contributes to Wrongful 
Convictions, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (2011) (citing Maxwell v. Roe, 
628 F.3d 486, 505 n.10 (9th Cir. 2010)) (describing one jailhouse snitch’s 
boast to have lied in exchange for “$30.00 from petty cash” and “some 
smokes and candy”); Morrison, supra note 18 (noting that a “successful 
cooperator . . . might ultimately get years off his sentence or even avoid 
prison altogether”). 
20. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 
1987). 
21. United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980). 
22. Robert Reinhold, California Shaken over an Informer: He Shows How 
to Fabricate a Prisoner’s Confession, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989, at A17 
(quoting Robert Berke, a lawyer for California Attorneys for Criminal 
Justice).  
23. FRED KAUFMAN, THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY 
PAUL MORIN 599, available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/mor
in_ch3cd.pdf. 
24 NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 71. 
25. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 72–73. 
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obtain details about fellow prisoners’ cases by speaking with complicit 
friends and relatives who can monitor preliminary hearings and other 
case proceedings and feed details to the aspiring snitch.26  In some 
cases, informants share knowledge about case facts with each other, 
permitting multiple informants to corroborate each other’s 
testimony.27  Investigators have documented cases in which prison 
inmates purchased information from others outside of prison in an 
attempt to trade it for reduced sentences.28  And now there is the 
Internet.  As one commentator has observed, “[t]he combination of the 
increasing availability of information over the internet and inmate 
internet access makes fabricating confessions even easier than ever 
before.”29 
The ease with which jailhouse informants can fabricate credible 
confessions was demonstrated by one particularly industrious snitch, 
Leslie Vernon White, a “convicted kidnapper, robber and car thief.”30  
In 1990, the CBS news program 60 Minutes aired a segment featuring 
White, a self-proclaimed jailhouse snitch.31  Two years earlier, White 
demonstrated for jailers how simple it was to concoct a confession and 
convince prosecutors it was genuine.32  He repeated the performance 
while on camera for the CBS news program.33  White’s methods were 
shocking in their audacity.  To get information, he simply picked up 
the telephone and asked for it.34  To get government officials to talk, 
White posed as a law enforcement official or a government worker, 
and in that guise, contacted various government agencies, including 
the Sheriff’s information bureau, the county coroner, and the district 
attorney handling the case, from whom he obtained details about the 
facts and evidence of the case.35  Then he arranged to be transported 
to or from the courthouse with the defendant who supposedly made 
 
26. Id. at 70–71. 
27. Id. at 68. 
28. See Brad Heath, How Snitches Buy Their Freedom, USA TODAY, Dec. 
14, 2012, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/14/jailhouse-
informants-for-sale/1762013/. 
29. Peter P. Handy, Jailhouse Informants' Testimony Gets Scrutiny 
Commensurate with Its Reliability, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 755, 759 
(2012). 
30. Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 591, 629 n.192 (2009) (quoting Steve Mills & Ken 
Armstrong, The Inside Informant, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1999, at A1). 
31 NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 71. 
32. Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Part 3: The Jailhouse Informant, CHI. 






35 Id.  
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the confession so that he could plausibly establish an opportunity for 
the defendant’s alleged confession to have been made to him.36 
Having gathered the basic case information and established a 
context in which the supposed confession occurred, it was easy for 
White to approach a homicide detective or a prosecutor with a deal.37  
“The key thing is they want to win,” White explained.38 
 
So if I come forward with the information as detailed 
as that they’re gonna use it.  Because the jury not 
knowing the system or how it works, is going to believe 
when I get up there with all these details and facts, 
that this guy sat in the jail cell, or he sat on the bus, 
or he sat in the holding tank somewhere, or told me 
through a door or something, they’re gonna believe 
me.39 
 
Over the course of several years, White appeared as a 
government witness in numerous cases and offered to appear in even 
more.40  In return, he received various rewards for doing so, including 
a letter recommending parole from a high-ranking official in the 
District Attorney’s office.41  These benefits did not always work out 
well for the citizens of California.  On White’s last furlough, he used 
the opportunity to beat his wife, snatch a purse, and assault his 
landlady with a knife.42 
As a result of the furor caused by White’s confession and his 
startling demonstration of the ease with which he could manufacture 
false jailhouse confessions, Los Angeles County convened a grand jury 
investigation.43  The Grand Jury commenced a year-long examination 
of the jailhouse informant problem in the County.44  What it found 
was even more shocking than White’s demonstration.  Based on 
extensive documentary and witness testimony, the Grand Jury 
learned of the existence of a complex and pervasive “informant 
system” at work in Los Angeles County, one that was driven by “the 
unwritten understanding between prosecutors and informants as to 
the benefits to be derived from their testimony.”45  In its report, the 
Grand Jury described a system set up to manufacture false jailhouse 
 
36. Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39.GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 72. 
40 See Reinhold, supra note 22. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43 GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
44 Id. at 2. 
45.Id. at 39. 
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informant testimony.46  At the county jail, known informants were 
segregated and housed in a special unit—known as the K-9 unit.47  
Police officers and prosecutors in need of additional evidence could 
request that an inmate be housed in the K-9 unit, and those requests 
were routinely granted.48  The delivery of fresh meat to the K-9 unit 
typically set off a feeding frenzy among the seasoned snitches housed 
there, and it was not unusual for several K-9 inmates to contact 
officials with reports of alleged confessions only hours after the 
unsuspecting prisoner’s arrival.49  Attempts to obtain information 
from the unwitting inmate might begin in minutes.50 
The Grand Jury found evidence that not only did clever 
informants like Leslie Vernon White find ways to gather facts needed 
to fool police and prosecutors into believing that they had heard a 
defendant confess to a crime, but in some cases police and prosecutors 
actively colluded with jailhouse informants to manufacture false 
evidence.51  These officials, some informants testified, provided them 
with copies of arrest reports, trial transcripts, and case files; took the 
informants to crime scenes; and sometimes simply fed them the facts 
of the crime in order to help the informants develop convincing 
testimony.52 
Snitches, moreover, risk little by fabricating false testimony.  
Perjury prosecutions of lying jailhouse informants are almost 
nonexistent.53  As a case in point, following the Los Angeles County 
Grand Jury’s investigation of the jailhouse informant problem, and 
despite discovery of large-scale and pervasive deception by jailhouse 
informants, the only two individuals prosecuted for providing 
perjured testimony in any court or case were the grand jury witnesses 
 
46 See id. at 19. 
47 Id. at 9. 
48 See id. at 54–55. 
49 See id. at 56 (“Within twenty-four hours of the inmate’s arrival . . . an informant 
called the Los Angeles Police Department and left a message for the detective that 
he had information about the inmate. . . . [T]hree days after arranging for the 
inmate to be placed with informants, the detective interviewed three informants, 
each of whom claimed to have obtained incriminating information from the 
inmate.”). 
50.Ted Rohrlich, Authorities Go Fishing for Jailhouse Confessions, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1990, at A1. 
51.See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 27–28. 
52 Id. 
53. For example, in an infamous case known as the “Marietta Seven,” 
James Creamer and six others were wrongfully convicted between 1973 
and 1975 of murdering two doctors in Marietta, Georgia, based largely 
on the perjured testimony of an informant testifying under immunity.  
THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 8–9.  After extensive findings 
undermining the snitch’s credibility, the convictions were reversed and 
charges dropped against all seven defendants.  Id. at 9–11.  Despite calls 
to prosecute the snitch, the District Attorney declined to bring perjury 
charges.  Id. at 11. 
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that had helped to expose the problems in the jailhouse snitch 
system.54  In contrast, snitches who helped convict other innocent 
defendants were never prosecuted.55  The message is clear—lying 
snitches have little to lose and everything to gain by falsely reporting 
to police and testifying to juries that fellow inmates have confessed to 
crimes. 
Witnesses suspected of lying to benefit criminal defendants, on 
the other hand, do not fare nearly so well. When a witness is thought 
to have lied on behalf of a criminal defendant, the witness is far more 
likely to be prosecuted for perjury.  In one prominent Illinois case 
involving the killing of a Chicago police officer, six witnesses initially 
gave statements to police implicating Jonathan Tolliver as a 
suspect.56  Those same witnesses later recanted their statements.57  
According to the witnesses, the original statements had been coerced 
from them by police.58  The witnesses, however, paid dearly for the 
recantations.  Five of the witnesses were charged with perjury and 
ultimately pled guilty to avoid even more serious sanctions.59  
Prosecutors then trumpeted the convictions as proof that the 
allegations that the witnesses’ testimony had been coerced by police 
were false.60 
Inmates thus find it easy to fabricate incriminating evidence 
against fellow defendants and costly to retract incriminating 
statements once made.  Where the rewards for providing 
incriminating evidence are great, and where the costs of providing 
false testimony on behalf of the State are negligible, the “frequency of 
fabrication by witnesses who have made ‘deals’ with the government,” 
as one commentator has observed, “while impossible to ascertain with 
accuracy, is potentially staggering.”61 
The easy availability of such powerful but unreliable evidence 
inevitably tempts both incautious and unethical prosecutors and law 
enforcement officials.  The temptation to use snitch testimony is so 
great, and the costs so low, that prosecutors frequently put on such 
 
54 See Ted Rohrlich, L.A. Jailhouse Informant Seized on Perjury Charge, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1992, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02-
20/news/mn-3537_1_jailhouse-informant-scandal; Ted Rohrlich, Perjurer 
Sentenced to 3 Years, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1992, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-20/local/me-312_1_law-enforcement-officer.  
55 See Rohrlick, Perjurer Sentenced to 3 Years, supra note 54. 
56 People v. Tolliver, 807 N.E.2d 524, 534–35 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
57.Id. 
58 Id. at 531–34. 
59.Stefano Esposito, Last of Five Accused of Perjury in Ceriale Slaying 
Trial Sentenced, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004. 
60 Id. 
61. R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice 
Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 
1129, 1130 (2004). 
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testimony despite multiple red flags.  Confirmation bias and tunnel 
vision are likely significant explanations for the frequency with which 
jailhouse snitch testimony that was later proved false is accepted and 
used by prosecutors.62  Confirmation bias describes the tendency, well 
documented by cognitive researchers, for individuals to seek out 
evidence that confirms their pre-existing beliefs and minimize or 
ignore evidence that contradicts those beliefs.63  Tunnel vision, 
similarly, refers to the tendency of persons to ignore or downplay facts 
or evidence inconsistent with an individual’s pre-existing beliefs.64  It 
is a product of the “‘compendium of common heuristics and logical 
fallacies,’ to which we are all susceptible, [and] that lead[s] actors in 
the criminal justice system to ‘focus on a suspect, select and filter the 
evidence that will “build a case” for conviction, while ignoring or 
suppressing evidence that points away from guilt.’”65  Prosecutorial 
tunnel vision has been identified as a major cause of wrongful 
convictions.66  Confirmation bias and tunnel vision help explain why 
prosecutors often continue to defend the credibility of jailhouse snitch 
testimony even after it has been confirmed in exoneration proceedings 
to have been false.67 
 
62. As Peter Joy has explained, “[t]here are a number of psychological 
impediments the prosecutor faces, including tunnel vision, which may 
make the prosecutor a poor judge” of a witness’s credibility.  Peter A. Joy, 
Constructing Systemic Safeguards Against Informant Perjury, 7 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 677, 680 (2010). 
63. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A 
Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 
(1998); Barbara O'Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that 
Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 
15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 315 (2009).  
64. See Barbara O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the 
Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in 
Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999, 1044 (2009) (“An 
investigator exhibiting tunnel vision selects and filters evidence with an 
eye toward building a case against that suspect and consequently 
overlooks evidence that undermines it.”). 
65 Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision 
in Criminal Cases, 2 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292 (2006) (quoting Dianne L. Martin, 
Lessons About Justice from the “Laboratory” of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel 
Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. Rev. 847, 
848 (2002)). 
66. Id. at 293 (noting that “[m]ost official inquiries into specific wrongful 
convictions have noted the role that tunnel vision played in those 
individual cases of injustice”). 
67. See Charles I. Lugosi, Punishing the Factually Innocent: DNA, 
Habeas Corpus And Justice, 12 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 233, 235 (2002) 
(noting that “even after DNA testing has proven the innocence of a 
prisoner, prosecutors refuse to accept the results and rely upon other 
evidence that supports guilt, or they create a new theory of how the crime 
occurred (never before put to the judge and jury) to justify the continued 
punishment of an innocent person”). 
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The ease with which false jailhouse snitch testimony can be 
manufactured also plays into the hands of corrupt police officers and 
prosecutors who are seeking shortcuts to conviction or are engaged in 
corrupt conduct.  Research on wrongful convictions, for example, 
demonstrates that police are likely to set up innocent people, when 
they do, by using evidence that is easy to manufacture and hard to 
disprove.68  Jailhouse snitch testimony fits that description.  As the 
first-hand accounts provided by seasoned snitches prove, it is almost 
laughably simple to conjure up a plausible, albeit false, claim that a 
criminal defendant made a jailhouse confession.  Once such 
allegations have been made by an informant, the informant has much 
to gain by sticking to his story, and even more to lose by retracting 
it.69 
 
B. Compensated Witnesses Are Inherently Biased 
 
A jailhouse informant is the quintessential self-interested 
witness.  Anglo-American law has long recognized the potentially 
distorting effects of self-interest on the accuracy and reliability of 
legal proceedings.70  Indeed, “[s]elf-interested witnesses were barred 
from testifying under early common law,”71 and informers in 
particular were viewed as incompetent witnesses if they stood to 
directly gain some material benefit from their testimony.72  Although 
 
68. See Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful 
Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133, 1153 (2013) (observing that 
corrupt law enforcement officers who framed innocent individuals in the 
Rampart scandal typically charged defendants with crimes that are 
“easily manufactured” and difficult to defend against because they pitted 
the police officers’ word against that of the defendant). 
69. In some cases, jailhouse snitch systems have operated, and may still 
be operating, that call into question the integrity and honesty of law 
enforcement officials at a system-wide level.  See GRAND JURY REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 18–19.  
70 See United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 210 (1842). 
71.Warren Moïse, I'm Booored! Bias and the Busy Trial Lawyer, S.C. L., 
Jan. 2009, at 10, 11; see also Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 210 (describing 
the general rule at common law as “undoubtedly” providing “in criminal 
cases as well as in civil cases, that a person interested in the event of the 
suit or prosecution, is not a competent witness”).  Justice Story, however, 
acknowledged numerous exceptions to the general rule.  For example, “a 
person who is to receive a reward for or upon the conviction of the 
offender” was “universally recognised as a competent witness, whether 
the reward be offered by the public or by private persons.”  Id. at 211 
(citing King v. Williams, 9 Barn. & Cress. 549, 556 for the grounds of the 
exception); Carla Spivack, Let's Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar 
Inheritance, 90 OR. L. REV. 247, 299 (2011) (noting the historical 
“common-law bar to interested witnesses testifying in any proceeding”).  
72. As counsel argued to the United States Supreme Court in United 
States v. Murphy, “[i]nformers are, generally, incompetent witnesses, 
where they are to receive any portion of the decree, sentence or judgment, 
without the necessity of a second suit.”  41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 205–06 (citing 
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the common-law bar on self-interested witnesses has generally been 
abandoned, awareness of the effect of self-interest on decision making 
continues to grow.73  Cognitive researchers have documented the 
powerful biasing effect of self-interest on objectivity.74  Human 
judgment is almost inevitably influenced, consciously or 
unconsciously, by perceived self-interest.75  Where persons must 
decide which of two positions to adopt or accept as true, those who 
stand to benefit from taking one position rather than another tend to 
favor the position that furthers their own self-interest.76  Recognition 
of the biasing effect of self-interest provides a basis for a wide variety 
of legal rules.  Self-interest bars some witnesses from testifying in 
probate proceedings,77 for instance, and “self-serving bias” has been 
recognized in some contexts as grounds for regulating the types of 
compensation that a witness might be provided for testifying. 
For example, normally “payments to witnesses in return for 
testimony are considered unethical and illegal.”78  Lawyers who 
provide such incentives to witnesses are subject to professional 
sanctions.79  There are, however, exceptions to the rule.  Expert 
witnesses, who are retained by parties and paid significant sums to 
 
United States v. The Schooner Thomas and Henry, 1 Brock. Rep. 374; 
Tilly's Case, 1 Str. 316; Rex v. Stone, 2 Ld. Raym. 1545).  
73 See Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1947–48 (2003). 
74. Id. (stating that the existence of self-serving bias has been 
established in numerous studies).  According to Griffith, “[s]elf-serving 
bias involves selective information processing, according to which a 
subject sees what it wants to see and conflates what is fair with what 
benefits oneself.”  Id. at 1948 (internal citations omitted). 
75. Id. at 1947–48. 
76. See Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 567, 569 (2003) (“It has long been understood that 
when people are better off if something is true, they become more likely 
to perceive it as true.”). 
77. Some states have enacted statutory bars on testimony by interested 
parties in probate proceedings.  See, e.g., Howle v. Edwards, 11 So. 748, 
749 (Ala. 1892) (discussing an 1891 statute providing that “no person 
having a pecuniary interest in the result of the suit shall be allowed to 
testify against the party to whom his interest is opposed, as to any 
transaction with or statement by the deceased person whose estate is 
interested in the result of the suit or proceedings”). 
78. George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches 
and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000). 
 79.  See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Wohl, 842 So. 2d 811, 815–16 (Fla. 2003) 
(imposing a 90-day suspension on a lawyer who provided financial 
inducement to a witness to provide factual testimony,  because “payment 
of compensation other than costs to a witness could adversely affect 
credibility and fact-finding functions”).  See generally Joseph Swanson, 
Let's Be Honest: A Critical Analysis of Florida Bar v. Wohl and the 
Generally Inconsistent Approach Toward Witness Inducement 
Agreements in Civil and Criminal Cases, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083 
(2005). 
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testify on the party’s behalf in court, are an obvious example.80  
Ethical rules attempt to constrain the degree to which compensated 
expert witnesses have a stake in the outcome of the cases in which 
they testify.81  Almost every jurisdiction forbids expert witnesses from 
being paid on a contingent fee basis in recognition that such a fee 
arrangement would unduly bias the expert’s testimony and be likely 
to induce the witness to tailor her testimony to favor the party on 
whose behalf she is testifying.82  Ethics experts have continued to 
express concern about even non-contingent-fee arrangements with 
expert witnesses.83  The mere act of soliciting an initial opinion in a 
case provides expert witnesses with incentives to provide a favorable 
assessment because doing so greatly enhances the likelihood that 
they will be retained and paid for future testimony.84 
In criminal law, aside from experts and the parties themselves, 
the most common type of compensated or incentivized witness is the 
informant.85  Informants come in many shapes and sizes.  There are 
informants on the street who are paid to feed information to police.86  
There are accomplices, codefendants, and coconspirators who seek 
cooperation deals with prosecutors in order to reduce or avoid their 
criminal exposure.87  The use of informants pervades the criminal 
justice system.  According to one account, approximately one in eight 
federal prisoners had their sentences reduced as a result of providing 
information to federal prosecutors.88  All such witnesses are prone to 
self-serving bias, as are the police and prosecutors who benefit from 
their testimony.89  One might argue, therefore, that all informant 
 
80 Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 465, 477 (1999) (“Unlike other witnesses who can be reimbursed for only 
expenses, an expert may be paid a fee for preparing and testifying in court.”). 
81 See, e.g., Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040, 1042 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(discussing ethical problems with contingent fees); Swafford v. Harris, 967 S.W.2d 
319, 322–23 (Tenn. 1998) (holding a contingency fee void as against public 
policy). 
82. Lubet, supra note 80. 
83 Id. at 477–78. 
84. Id. at 478. 
85 Harris, supra note 78. 
86 Id. at 3. 
87. See Morrison, supra note 18, at 931 (describing how cooperating 
defendants are recruited by prosecutors). 
88. See Heath, supra note 28. 
89. Of course, many types of witnesses testify in contexts where it is clear 
that they have an interest in the outcome.  Mothers testify about the good 
character of their children, and husbands and wives, girlfriends and 
boyfriends, friends and coworkers testify about alibis of their friends and 
loved ones. Plaintiffs and defendants testify about facts surrounding civil 
disputes with thousands or even millions of dollars on the line.  As 
explained below, jailhouse snitches are demonstrably different.  They 
have no direct knowledge of the facts of a case, little if any reputation to 
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testimony, and perhaps all incentivized testimony more generally, is 
compromised as a result of self-serving bias.90 
Jailhouse snitches, however, pose more of a problem than paid 
expert witnesses or even other types of snitches.  The impact of a 
biased expert witness can be muted in many cases by the proffer of 
competing expert testimony.  In a classic “battle of experts,” each side 
can call out an opposing expert whose opinion strays too far from the 
facts or mainstream science, or at least make clear to the jury that 
the opposing expert’s interpretation is subject to debate.  In addition, 
most credible expert witnesses face reputational constraints that 
limit the expert’s willingness to proffer knowingly false or misleading 
testimony.91  The same cannot be said for jailhouse snitches whose 
reputations are already marginal.  Nor is it realistic to think that 
criminal defendants can combat jailhouse snitch testimony, or even 
the testimony of cooperating accomplice witnesses, street snitches, 
and the like, by calling comparable witnesses of their own.  A criminal 
defendant lacks the ability to commandeer helpful testimony from 
such witnesses because, unlike the prosecutor, he lacks any power to 
reward such witnesses with leniency or immunity from prosecution.92  
And whereas prosecutors routinely reward street informants for 
information and testimony, a criminal defendant who paid a street 
informant to testify on his behalf would likely be charged with 
tampering or bribing witnesses.93  Nonetheless, it is not implausible 
to assume that in many cases some types of cooperating accomplices 
and street snitches do have a credible basis for their testimony.  
Testimony provided by a codefendant who admits to being present at 
the crime scene, for example, can be tested against the known facts 
and evidence in the case, including the defendant’s own account 
where the defendant chooses to testify. 
In contrast, a criminal defendant is typically helpless to counter 
testimony provided by a lying jailhouse informant.  Unlike with 
experts, defendants cannot usually put on their own “jailhouse 
snitch,” so criminal defendants lack any opportunity to fight back on 
an even playing field.  In criminal trials there is no “battle of snitches” 
 
protect, and direct and powerful incentives to manufacture testimony 
that is easy to conjure and difficult to rebut. 
90. That a witness has received payments from the government in 
exchange for information or cooperation is a materially exculpatory fact 
that must be disclosed pursuant to Brady v. Maryland.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the 
government’s failure to disclose that a witnesses had received payments 
from the FBI violated Brady). 
91 Lubet, supra note 80, at 465. 
92. See J. Richard Johnston, Paying the Witness, Why Is it OK for the 
Prosecution, but Not the Defense?, 11 CRIM. JUST., no. 4, Winter 1997, at 
21 (arguing that compensating witnesses violates the federal bribery 
statute). 
93 Id. at 22. 
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that might balance competing versions of events.  The criminal 
defendant can try, as many have, to call other inmates to testify that 
the defendant did not make any jailhouse confession.94  But such 
testimony is, on its face, usually irrelevant, and courts will often bar 
it as such.95  Even when allowed, however, it is not likely to be 
effective.  After all, such witnesses cannot prove the negative—that 
an alleged confession did not actually occur—if the jailhouse 
informant testifies, as an untruthful jailhouse informant invariably 
will, that the confession was made out of earshot of other prisoners.  
Finally, whereas ethical rules bar contingent fee agreements with 
experts out of fear that such arrangements will bias witness 
testimony, jailhouse informants—and indeed all informants—testify 
almost exclusively under arrangements that create de facto 
contingent payment arrangements. Because “payment” in terms of 
leniency almost always is granted by the prosecutor after the 
informant testifies, the informant readily understands that the 
informant’s chances of getting rewarded are contingent on his 
delivery of credible incriminating evidence against the defendant. 
 
II. JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY IS HIGHLY PERSUASIVE 
EVIDENCE 
 
Jailhouse snitch testimony is problematic for another reason. 
There is, by and large, only one thing to which a jailhouse snitch can 
testify: that a fellow inmate confessed, and confession evidence is 
widely acknowledged to possess unique potency.96  As the Supreme 
Court has observed, confessions are “probably the most probative and 
damaging evidence that can be admitted.”97  One prominent evidence 
scholar asserted that “introduction of a confession makes the other 
aspects of a trial in court superfluous.”98  Research confirms that 
evidence that the defendant has confessed greatly increases the odds 
of conviction.99  In a study conducted by Kassin and Neumann, 
researchers presented mock jurors with a variety of evidence of guilt, 
and found that jurors were far more likely to convict suspects when 
the evidence included a confession than when other types of 
traditional evidence, such as eyewitness identifications or physical 
 
94 See, e.g., Short v. Sirmons, 472 F.3d 1177, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
the impeachment testimony of a fellow cellmate was not material). 
95 Id. 
96 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968) (White, J., dissenting). 
97. Id. 
98. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 316 (2d ed. 
1983). 
99 Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power of Confession Evidence: 
An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 469, 471 (1997). 
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evidence, were presented.100  They thus concluded that “confession 
evidence has a greater impact on jurors—and is seen as having a 
greater impact by jurors—than other potent types of evidence.”101 
Secondary confessions—that is, confessions made to witnesses 
(other than police officers)—are likely not as persuasive to jurors as 
direct confessions.102  Jurors do, as a general matter, discount 
secondary confession evidence to some extent, and jurors may often 
be unwilling to convict based on secondary confession evidence 
alone.103  However, secondary confession evidence remains extremely 
potent.  “Since few species of evidence are as powerful as an 
acknowledgement of guilt from the mouth of the accused, jailhouse 
informant testimony can be highly persuasive.”104  Secondary 
confession evidence is likely to be particularly critical in “close 
cases.”105  That is, jailhouse snitch testimony is likely to be most 
influential where the State has some other evidence of guilt, but that 
other evidence is weak.106  And these cases are precisely the ones in 
which jailhouse snitches are most likely to be used.107  After all, the 
State must pay a price to induce the jailhouse snitch to testify, and it 
can be expected to avoid doing so unless prosecutors believe that the 
testimony is needed.108  Accordingly, jailhouse snitch testimony will 
typically only be introduced when the prosecutor is concerned about 
the sufficiency of her case, and the testimony will tend to have the 
greatest impact in precisely those cases.109 
The prevailing assumption by courts, and the justification for 
admitting jailhouse snitch testimony absent any significant 
reliability review or assessment, is that jurors are capable of 
discounting unreliable snitch testimony as the facts and 
circumstances warrant.110  This assumption is almost certainly 
incorrect.  Research on fundamental attribution error demonstrates 
that jurors cannot properly discount snitch testimony, even when 
they know that snitches have incentives to lie.111 
 
100 Id. at 481. 
101. Id. 
102 Lisa Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules Guide 
Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, 33 QUEEN'S L.J. 261, 274 (2008).  
103 Id. 
104. Id. 
105 Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et. al., The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse 
Informants on Jury Decisionmaking, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 137, 138 (2008). 
106. Cf., Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the 
Jury: An Experimental Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 27, 27 (1997) (noting that evidence of coerced confessions was 
extremely influential in a test case where other evidence was weak).  
107 Neuschatz et al., supra note 105. 
108 Id. 
109 See id. 
110 Kassin & Neumann, supra note 99, at 470. 
111 Neuschatz et al., supra note 105, at 142. 
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 In a recent study, a team of researchers set out to test the claim 
that jurors are able to effectively discount secondary confession 
evidence provided by a cooperating witness with incentives to 
fabricate evidence.112  Their findings undercut the assertion that 
jurors are able to properly take into account the degree to which 
witness incentives undermine reliability.113  In the study, the 
researchers recruited 345 college students and persons from the 
community to act as mock jurors.114  All of the mock jurors were given 
an abbreviated trial transcript drawn from a real criminal case.115  
The transcript set forth the testimony of two state witnesses, one who 
provided fiber evidence and another who presented knife evidence, 
and included opening and closing statements.116  The control group 
received this transcript only.117  Other groups received the same 
transcript, plus the testimony of an additional witness who claimed 
to have heard the defendant confess to the crime.118  In some cases, 
mock jurors were told that the witness had inadvertently learned of 
the crime and came forward as an act of civic duty.119  In other cases, 
they were told that the witness was testifying pursuant to a 
cooperation deal in which the witness would directly benefit from his 
testimony.120  The researchers then asked all of the mock jurors to 
assess the guilt of the defendant.121  Consistent with prior research, 
researchers found that mock jurors who were given the confession 
evidence convicted the defendant at significantly higher rates than 
those who were not presented the confession evidence.122 
More disturbing, however, the researchers found that the mock 
jurors who were presented with the confession evidence convicted at 
the same rate regardless of the source of the evidence.123  Conviction 
rates, their data indicated, “were unaffected by the explicit provision 
of information indicating that the witness received an incentive to 
testify.”124  Although the mock jurors’ questionnaire responses 
demonstrated that they understood that the “civic duty” witness was 
more interested in serving justice than the “incentivized” witness, the 
 
112. Id. at 137. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 139. 
115 Id. at 140–41. 






122. Id. at 142. 
123 Id. 
124. Id. 
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mock jurors failed to discount the reliability of the incentivized 
witness.125 
The most plausible explanation for these results, as the 
researchers suggest, is that the mock jurors were committing 
“fundamental attribution error.”126  As they explain, “According to the 
fundamental attribution hypothesis, perceivers will ignore the 
contextual and situational factors in favor of a dispositional 
attribution.  In application to a jury situation, jurors should perceive 
a witness’ behavior as influenced by personal factors rather than 
situational demands.”127 
The vast majority of participants in the experiment seemed to 
make just this mistake, dismissing the possibility that important 
contextual factors like incentives for incriminating another suspect 
might influence the witness’s motives to provide truthful 
testimony.128  The mock jurors instead simply accepted the witness’s 
testimony at face value.129 
Prior studies similarly have concluded that “attributors attach 
insufficient weight to situational causes and accept behavior at ‘face 
value.’”130  To be sure, some of these studies have found evidence that 
subjects were able to engage in some critical assessment of certain 
types of confession evidence.131  For instance, where subjects were 
told that a confession was coerced through threats or violence, they 
tended to more heavily discount the credibility of the confession.132  
After conducting one such study in which investigators provided 
subjects with trial transcripts from a mock case presenting a variety 
of evidence to the subjects, the investigators found that the subjects 
consistently gave some types of evidence more weight than others.133  
Although subjects continued to be more likely to convict in confession 
cases than nonconfession cases, subjects generally viewed confessions 
made in exchange for positive rewards as more credible than 
confessions made in response to threats.134 
 
When the coercive influence was operationally defined 
as a threat of harm or punishment, subjects clearly 






129. Id. at 142, 146. 
130. Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Prior Confessions and 
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confession as involuntary and manifested a relatively 
low rate of conviction.  However, when coercion took 
the form of an offer or a promise of leniency, subjects 
were unable or unwilling to dismiss the prior 
confession.135 
 
Although this research demonstrates that jurors have the 
capacity to overcome fundamental attribution bias and discount 
certain types of confession evidence, it does nothing to increase 
confidence in jurors’ capacity to properly assess jailhouse snitch 
testimony induced through positive incentives.  Rather, these 
findings cast further doubt on jurors’ ability to adequately discount 
the reliability of jailhouse snitch testimony that has been induced 
through positive incentives. 
Juror insensitivity to the increased unreliability of incentivized 
witness testimony is magnified by two additional factors.  First, as 
discussed above, typical jurors almost certainly do not understand 
how easy it is for jailhouse snitches to manufacture detailed false 
confessions.  If jailhouse snitches testify about details that seem like 
they could only have been learned if the perpetrator had actually 
confessed to the snitch, but were actually gathered through the 
variety of approaches that snitches like Sidney Storch have admitted 
to using, then jailhouse snitch testimony will often be viewed as more 
credible than it should be. 
Second, many jurors might perceive jailhouse snitch testimony as 
worthy of enhanced credence because of implicit or explicit 
prosecutorial bolstering of the witness’s credibility.  The mere fact 
that a prosecutor calls a jailhouse informant to serve as a State’s 
witness suggests that the prosecutor has already determined the 
witness to be credible and truthful.  Although the amount of 
presumptive credit the jury extends to state witnesses will vary 
depending on both the local community’s and the individual juror’s 
views regarding prosecutorial honesty and integrity, in many 
jurisdictions the State begins with the benefit of the doubt.136 
Moreover, even though it constitutes improper practice, it is not 
uncommon for prosecutors to affirmatively vouch for, or bolster, the 
 
135. Id. at 143–44. 
136. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and 
Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1423, 1465 (2001) (“The prosecutor enjoys presumptive credibility 
in the eyes of the jury and, unlike witnesses who take an oath and are 
subject to testing through cross-examination and impeachment, the 
prosecutor is rarely specifically so challenged.”); see also United States v. 
Gonzalez-Vargas, 558 F.2d 631, 633 (1st Cir. 1977) (observing that “the 
representative of the government approaches the jury with the inevitable 
asset of tremendous credibility”); THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 
17 (stating that “jurors are somewhat predisposed to infer some degree of 
reliability because the witness is presented by the state”). 
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credibility of the jailhouse snitches they put on the witness stand.137  
Take the controversial case of Troy Davis, who was executed in 
2011.138  Davis was tried for the 1989 murder of Savannah police 
officer Mark McPhail.139  At Davis’ trial in 1991, the State called a 
jailhouse snitch named Kevin McQueen to testify about an alleged 
confession made by Davis while the two men were on the prison 
basketball court.140  The snitch’s testimony was suspect.  Not only had 
McQueen served as an informant for the State in other cases,141 but 
his testimony was also seemingly implausible on its face.  Numerous 
witnesses testified at Davis’ trial that the persons who were involved 
with the police officer shooting had been playing pool at a local pool 
hall, that a man named Sylvester “Red” Coles had gotten into an 
argument with a homeless man outside the pool hall, and that Troy 
Davis and a friend—who had both also been playing pool at the hall 
at the time—had followed Coles and his victim up the street to a 
Burger King parking lot where the police officer—who was 
responding to the fight between Coles and the homeless man—was 
shot.142 
When the State called jailhouse snitch McQueen to testify at 
trial, however, McQueen claimed that Troy Davis had “confessed” to 
him a very different set of facts.143  According to McQueen, Davis told 
him that he had gone to a party in Cloverdale,144 a Savannah suburb, 
 
137. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985) (“The 
prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his 
personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused . . . may induce the 
jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the 
evidence.”). 
138 Kim Severson, Georgia Inmate Executed; Raised Racial Issues in Death 
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at A1.  
139 Trial transcript at 1228, State v. Davis, No. 089-2467 (E.D. Super. Ct. Ga Oct. 
25, 1991) [hereinafter Davis Trial Transcript]. 
140 Id. at 1229. 
141. Id. at 1228. 
142 Id. at 1230. 
143 Id. 
144. Id. at 1230–31. (McQueen also claimed that Davis had confessed to 
shooting someone at the party.  According to McQueen, “when he was at 
the party, he got into a beef with some dudes, and a whole bunch of 
shooting and stuff going on. So after the party -- ”  The D.A. interrupted. 
“Did he say he did any shooting?”  “Yeah,” McQueen answered.  The D.A. 
began to ask if “he was the one that shot” an individual named Michael 
Cooper at the party, as Davis had been charged with that shooting in 
addition to the shooting of police officer Mark McPhail.  However, before 
the prosecutor could get the name of the shooting victim out, defense 
counsel cut him off, asking the judge to counsel the prosecutor not to lead 
the witness.  The judge obliged.  The prosecutor then rephrased his 
question: “What did he say about shooting somebody at the party?”  
McQueen’s answer was vague: “Well, exchange of gunfire. He didn’t know 
who shot who, you know, I guess it was the wrong guy, you know, got 
hung up that night.”  McQueen then testified that Davis told him that.) 
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and that after the party, he had gone to his girlfriend’s house, that 
they had decided to get breakfast at Burger King, and that he ran into 
someone who owed Davis money that was loaned to buy “dope.”145  
According to McQueen, Davis told him that “they got into some beef 
there, and then a whole bunch of commotion started, and a dude came 
in what turned out to be Officer McPhail, and there were some shots 
fired.”146  On cross-examination, McQueen admitted that he had seen 
a story about the shooting on the news but denied “hoping to gain any 
advantage by testifying on behalf of the State, claiming that he had 
already been sentenced for his crimes.”147 
The supposed confession recounted by McQueen failed to match 
up in almost any way with the other evidence in the case.  McQueen’s 
version of the confession put Davis in the wrong place, at the wrong 
time, for the wrong reasons, in light of the evidence presented at trial 
and the State’s own theory of the case.148  In fact, McQueen’s account 
of this supposed confession was deemed, by the federal district court 
judge who years later conducted a three-day habeas hearing on Troy 
Davis’s contention of actual innocence, to be patently false because it 
“totally contradict[ed] the events of the night as described by 
numerous other State witnesses.”149  Indeed, the judge found that 
McQueen’s trial testimony “was so clearly fabricated” that the Court 
could not understand “why the State persist[ed] in trying to support 
its veracity.”150 
But the State’s position at trial and beyond was that McQueen’s 
testimony was solid and credible.151  In his closing argument to the 
jury, Savannah District Attorney Spencer Lawton beseeched the jury 
to credit McQueen’s testimony.152  As he told the jury: 
 
You heard from Kevin McQueen.  Kevin McQueen 
was, in Mr. Barker’s terms, the jailbird.  Well, if you’re 
going to talk to Troy Anthony Davis about what he did, 
you’ve got to be where Troy Anthony Davis is, and 
Kevin McQueen told you that he was told by Troy 
Anthony Davis that . . . Davis had shot Officer 
McPhail.  There’s not a reason on earth to doubt his 
word.  There was nothing, no reason why he had to be 
 
145 Id. 
146. Id. at 1231. 
147. In re Davis, No. CV 409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *30 (S.D. Ga. 
Aug. 24, 2010). 
148 Id. at *49. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151 Davis Trial Transcript, supra note 139. 
152 Id. 
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here, except that we subpoenaed him when we learned 
what he had to say.153 
 
Notwithstanding that the jailhouse snitch’s testimony was later 
dismissed as “clearly fabricated,” jurors were assured by the District 
Attorney that “there’s not a reason on earth to doubt his word.”154  It 
is difficult, in retrospect, to ascertain the weight that the jury 
ultimately gave to McQueen’s testimony, but the attempt by 
prosecutors to bolster McQueen’s testimony and convince the jury 
that the jailhouse snitch was a reliable witness certainly could have 
contributed to the jury’s decision to convict. 
 
III. STATUS QUO SAFEGUARDS ARE INEFFECTIVE 
 
Despite the virtual avalanche of evidence that jailhouse snitch 
testimony is inherently biased, unreliable, and frequently the cause 
of wrongful convictions, few jurisdictions have taken any meaningful 
steps to limit its use, and none bar it completely.155  Defenders of the 
status quo contend that the traditional tools of litigation—vigorous 
cross-examination and post-conviction review—adequately enable 
criminal defendants to discredit lying jailhouse snitches or, where 
jailhouse testimony was only later revealed to have been perjured, to 
obtain postconviction relief.156  For reasons discussed below, neither 
of these supposedly reliable litigation tools provides innocent 
defendants with meaningful protections from being wrongfully 
convicted because of false jailhouse snitch testimony. 
 
A. Cross-Examination Constitutes an Inadequate Means to Check 
False or Unreliable Jailhouse Snitch Testimony. 
 
In Kansas v. Ventris,157 the U.S. Supreme Court had an 
opportunity to adopt sweeping limitations on the use of jailhouse 
informant testimony.158  Defendant Ray Ventris had been convicted 
of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery after he and an 
accomplice named Rhonda Theel shot and killed a man in his home 
and drove away with approximately $300 and the victim’s cell 
phone.159  Theel pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and agreed to 
 
153. Id. at 1501 (emphasis added). 
154 Id. 
155 See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 143 (explaining several states’ limitations on 
jailhouse snitch testimony). 
156 Id. at 142 (stating that the Supreme Court relies on the traditional litigation 
tools, like cross-examination, to combat the potential for error in snitch testimony). 
157 556 U.S. 586 (2008). 
158. Id. at 594 n.* (rejecting the suggestion that the Court craft a broader 
rule to exclude uncorroborated jailhouse snitch testimony). 
159 Id. at 588–89. 
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testify against Ventris.160  In exchange, prosecutors agreed not to 
prosecute Theel for murder.161  At trial, Theel testified that Ventris 
was the main instigator, while Ventris testified that Theel was 
primarily responsible for the robbery and shooting.162 
The State then called a jailhouse informant who had been 
planted in Ventris’s holding cell for the specific purpose of gathering 
“incriminating statements” from Ventris.163  Although the State 
conceded that use of the jailhouse informant to elicit incriminating 
statements from Ventris likely violated the Sixth Amendment, the 
trial court permitted the informant’s testimony regarding Ventris’s 
statements to come in for impeachment purposes.164  The informant 
then testified that Ventris confessed to him that “‘[h]e’d shot this man 
in his head and in his chest’ and taken ‘his keys, his wallet, about 
$350.00, and . . . a vehicle.’”165 
The jury acquitted Ventris on the murder count, but convicted 
him of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery.166  The Kansas 
Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the admission 
of Ventris’s purported confession obtained in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment for impeachment purposes was erroneous.167  When the 
case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Ventris and amici on his behalf 
argued, inter alia, that “jailhouse snitches are so inherently 
unreliable” that the Court should “craft a broader exclusionary rule 
for uncorroborated statements obtained by that means.”168  The Court 
rejected that argument.169 
As the Court explained, “[o]ur legal system . . . is built on the 
premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of 
competing witnesses, and we have long purported to avoid 
‘establish[ing] this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation 
of state rules of criminal procedure.”170  The Court concluded that 
statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment may be 
used for impeachment purposes, and that the credibility of the 




162. Id. at 589. 
163. Id. 
164 Id. 
165. Id. (quoting State v. Ventris, No. 94,002, 2006 WL 2661161, at *3 
(Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2006)).  
166 Id. 
167 Id. (citing State v. Ventris, 176 P.3d 920, 928 (Kan. 2008)). 
168.State v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009). 
169 Id. 
170. Id. (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967)); see also 
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (quoting United 
States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)) (“A fundamental 
premise of our criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector.’”). 
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confession was a matter for the jury to determine.171  The Court thus 
declined to impose more stringent regulation of jailhouse informant 
testimony.  Reasoning similarly, numerous state courts have also 
rejected calls for greater regulation of jailhouse informant 
testimony.172 
The Court’s holding in Ventris followed the conventional notion 
that credibility and reliability determinations should normally be left 
to the fact finder.173  As the Court noted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,174 “[v]igorous cross examination, presentation 
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof 
are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but 
admissible evidence.”175 
The assumption, however, that vigorous cross-examination 
provides an effective means of exposing or defeating unreliable 
evidence is increasingly being questioned with respect to certain 
types of evidence.  The Oregon State Supreme Court recently decided 
that in cases involving eyewitness identifications obtained through 
suggestive police procedures, “‘traditional’ methods of testing 
reliability—like cross-examination—can be ineffective at discrediting 
unreliable or inaccurate eyewitness identification evidence.”176  As 
the Oregon court noted, research studies have demonstrated that 
mock jurors are surprisingly bad at distinguishing accurate and 
inaccurate eyewitness identifications.177  Prominent academic 
commentators have also concluded that judges and jurors often fail to 
properly discount all sorts of direct and factual evidence, including 
eyewitness testimony, because they are “often not aware of the factors 
that decrease the reliability of eyewitness perception and memory,” 
and not nearly as competent at evaluating the veracity of witnesses 
testifying in court as commonly thought.178 
 
171. Ventris, 556 U.S. at 594. 
172. See, e.g., Parrish v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Ky. 2003) 
(rejecting a claim that testimony of a jailhouse informant should have 
been excluded because it was inherently suspect, and its reliability 
should have been the subject of a cautionary admonition because the rule 
is that “the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given sworn 
testimony are matters for the jury to decide”). 
173 See Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(stating “it is the job of the fact finder, not the trial court, to determine which 
source is more credible and reliable”). 
174 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
175. Id. at 596.  
176. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 695 (Or. 2012). 
177. Id. at 695 n.9 (citing R.C.L. Lindsey et al., Can People Detect 
Eyewitness–Identification Inaccuracy Within and Across Situations?, 66 
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79 (1981)). 
178. Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is Expert Evidence 
Really Different?, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2013) (arguing that 
the relevancy standard for factual evidence may be too lax). 
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For these same reasons, the Court’s assumption in Ventris that 
impeachment of unreliable or untruthful witnesses is sufficient to 
protect criminal defendants from wrongful convictions is wrong in the 
case of jailhouse snitches.  As noted above, confession evidence is a 
uniquely potent form of evidence in criminal trials.  Jurors are almost 
certain to give extraordinary weight to evidence that a defendant has 
confessed.  Where confession evidence has been obtained through the 
use of coercion, the courts have long recognized that such evidence is 
inadmissible, and that the conventional means of impeaching 
unreliable evidence—cross-examination—provides insufficient 
protection against undue prejudice.179  As Justice White observed in 
Arizona v. Fulminante180:  
 
A defendant’s confession is “probably the most 
probative and damaging evidence that can be 
admitted against him,” so damaging that a jury should 
not be expected to ignore it even if told to do so.  
Moreover, it is impossible to know what credit and 
weight a juror gave to a confession.181   
 
Strict exclusion is sometimes the only appropriate remedy where 
extremely damaging but unreliable evidence threatens to “distort the 
truth-seeking function of the trial.”182 
Second, because jurors are likely to proceed under the biasing 
influence of fundamental attribution error, the traditional stuff of 
impeachment—the demonstration that a jailhouse snitch has a poor 
character for honesty and self-interested motives to testify—will often 
have little or no impact on jury decision making.  Once the jury has 
heard the evidence that the defendant has confessed to the crime, the 
damage has already been done. 
Third, unlike most other types of evidence frequently used in 
criminal cases, jailhouse snitch testimony is often uniquely insulated 
from effective impeachment.  This insulation exists in part because 
the incentives that jailhouse informants receive in exchange for 
cooperation are typically hidden.183  Prosecutors rarely negotiate 
 
179 See United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 50 (D.D.C. 2006) (“A long line 
of Supreme Court precedent makes clear, ‘confessions which are involuntary, i.e., 
the product of coercion, either physical or psychological,’ are inadmissible.”). 
180 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
181. Id. at 292 (quoting Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) 
(White, J., dissenting)). 
182. Id. at 293. 
183. See Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1167 n.215 (noting that “[e]xamples 
abound of significant inducements to accomplice witnesses that were 
hidden from the defense at trial”); Harvey A. Silverglate, The Decline and 
Fall of Mens Rea, 33 CHAMPION, Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 14, 18 (noting that 
“in practice, many types of inducements and threats often are implied, 
the subject of a knowing wink of the eye by the prosecutor to the 
COVEY_FINALAUTHORREAD.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2015  2:07 PM 
201x] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 127 
explicit deals with jailhouse snitches prior to their testimony.184  
Rather, prosecutors and snitches operate with a shared 
understanding that a snitch’s positive performance will eventually be 
rewarded with tangible benefits.185  The lack of any record of benefits 
promised to the informant impedes effective impeachment by defense 
counsel, just as it was designed to do.186  The usual practice of refusing 
to enter into any formal deal before the snitch testifies in court was 
documented in one Florida case, where the prosecutor’s notes 
memorializing his conversation with the snitch were later discovered 
and became the subject of a Brady dispute.187  Here is how the 
prosecutor summarized his conversation: “Spoke with Fred Landt 
[Freeman’s defense counsel] regarding Dennis Freeman.  Told him I 
would make no firm offer prior to [Ponticelli’s] trial but assured him 
his cooperation would be remembered with favor before mitigating 
judge/Sturgis.  Will make no formal deal on the record prior to 
trial.”188 
At an evidentiary hearing on the Brady claim, the prosecutor 
denied that the note indicated that she had made any undisclosed 
deal with the informant.189  Regardless whether that claim was 
technically correct, the note evidences what is already acknowledged 
to be standard practice: prosecutors avoid making any formal deals 
prior to trial, but provide sufficient post-trial rewards to snitches to 
ensure a steady future supply.190  That practice was also apparent in 
the notorious case of Cameron Todd Willingham.191  Willingham was 
accused in Texas of murdering his three young daughters by arson.192  
At his capital trial, Texas prosecutors called jailhouse snitch Johnny 
Webb, who was serving a fifteen-year sentence for aggravated 
robbery, to testify about a confession Willingham supposedly made.193  
 
prospective witness's lawyer”), available at 
http://www.threefeloniesaday.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=rdMd9mcf
5ZA%3D&tabid=38. 
184 Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1144 n.80. 
185  Id. at 1129. 
186 Id. at 1142.  
187 Ponticelli v. State, 941 So. 2d 1073, 1085 (Fla. 2006). 
188. Id. 
189 Id. 
190  Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1148. 
191 Willingham v. Cockrell, No. 02-10133, 2003 WL 1107011 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 
2001). 
192 Id. at *1. 
193 Paul Gianelli, Junk Science and the Execution of an Innocent Man, 7 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & LIBERTY 221, 234 (2013) (explaining that lawyers seeking a posthumous 
exoneration of Willingham have uncovered records indicating that, in fact, 
prosecutors reduced charges against Webb from aggravated robbery to simple 
robbery and also advocated on his behalf at a clemency hearing, citing his 
participation in the Willingham case as a basis). 
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After testifying improbably that Willingham, who hardly knew Webb, 
confessed to him through a hole in a steel door in Willingham’s cell, 
Webb denied that prosecutors had offered him any inducement to 
testify.194  Nonetheless, “[f]ive years later the prosecutor asked the 
Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant Webb parole.”195  Webb 
later recanted his trial testimony, but then recanted his 
recantation.196  Willingham, who is widely believed to be innocent, 
was executed by Texas in 2004.197 
Jailhouse snitch testimony is also difficult to impeach effectively 
because it is invariably of the “he said-she said” variety.  As long as 
the snitch can plausibly testify that he had an opportunity—no 
matter how fleeting—to speak with the defendant, the snitch’s claim 
that the defendant confessed to him is practically unverifiable.  
Defense counsel can impugn the credibility of the snitch, but many 
criminal defendants—especially defendants with a criminal history—
go into a jury trial with their own credibility highly suspect and will 
often be unlikely to come out on top in any swearing contest.  Whether 
or not the jailhouse snitch is perceived to be believable may ultimately 
turn simply on the comparative rhetorical skills of the prosecutor and 
defense counsel.198  Defense attorneys equipped with superior cross-
examination skills may successfully blunt the force of a jailhouse 
snitch’s testimony, but the vast majority of criminal defendants 
saddled with average or inferior counsel will have no such luck.  It is 
not unusual, moreover, for trial courts to affirmatively prevent the 
defense from even questioning the snitch about the snitch’s criminal 
history or the charges pending against him.199 
 
194. Id. at 233–34; see Brandi Grissom, Citing New Evidence, Urging a 
Posthumous Pardon in 1992 Case, TEX. TRIB., Sept. 26, 2013, at A19A, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/us/citing-new-evidence-
urging-a-posthumous-pardon-in-1992-case.html?_r=0.  
195. Gianelli, supra note 193, at 233–34. 
196. Id. at 234–35 (noting also that Webb later admitted to a reporter 
from The New Yorker magazine that he might have “misunderstood” 
Willingham, adding “[t]he statute of limitations has run out on perjury, 
hasn’t it?”). 
197. See Cameron Todd Willingham: Wrongfully Convicted and Executed 
in Texas, INNOCENTS PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Cameron_Todd_Willingham_
Wrongfully_Convicted_and_Executed_in_Texas.php (last visited Sept. 1, 
2014); David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, 
THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann. 
198. Stephen Bright made this point more generally in the context of 
death penalty litigation.  See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The 
Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 
YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994). 
199 See, e.g., Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 821–822 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing 
the trial court’s enforcement of the motion in limine precluding “the defense ‘from 
mentioning or attempting to elicit testimony from any witness regarding the reason 
for [the jailhouse snitch’s] incarceration’”). 
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Apart from simply impeaching the character of the snitch or the 
circumstances or plausibility of the snitch’s claim, there is very little 
that defense counsel can do to counter snitch testimony.  For a variety 
of reasons, defense lawyers can rarely call witnesses of their own to 
prove that the defendant did not confess to the snitch.200  In most 
cases, a lying snitch will simply testify that the defendant confessed 
in private, when there were no other witnesses to overhear the alleged 
confession.201  And in some cases, inmates work together to 
corroborate each other’s false testimony.202  The Los Angeles County 
Grand Jury investigation on the County’s use of jailhouse informants 
discovered several instances in which multiple inmates coordinated 
their trial testimony to make their false claims more credible.203  Not 
only is it difficult to find jailhouse witnesses who can effectively 
counter snitch testimony, in some cases it is positively hazardous to 
even try.204  One attorney told the Los Angeles Grand Jury that 
jailhouse informants were so uniformly untrustworthy that he was 
afraid to even interview them because he feared they might fabricate 
some criminal activity that the attorney was engaged in, such as 
suborning perjury.205  Whereas under current law prosecutors are 
permitted to reward informants and cooperating witnesses with 
substantial benefits in exchange for their helpful testimony, defense 
lawyers have no comparable authority.206  Indeed, defense lawyers 
who offer rewards to defense witnesses might be prosecuted for 
witness tampering.207 
In sum, the dynamics of jailhouse snitch testimony make cross-
examination uniquely ill-suited to produce reliable results.  While 
suffering many similar defects, other forms of incentivized testimony, 
such as that provided by cooperating accomplices, co-defendants, and 
street snitches, at least provide defense counsel with some objective 
factual context that might be used to assess the credibility of the 
witness.  As the NACDL argued to the Supreme Court in Ventris, 
accomplice testimony retains at least some indicia of reliability 
 
200 See, e.g., C. Blaine Elliott, Life’s Uncertainties: How to Deal with Cooperating 
Witnesses and Jailhouse Snitches, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 1, 10 (2003) (“A defense 
witness whose freedom is at stake is often too scared of retribution to come 
forward and offer valuable exculpatory evidence.”). 
201  See, e.g., id. at 1 (describing the story of one man wrongfully convicted of 
murder because a snitch lied about a confession). 
202 See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 18, 30. 
203 See id. 
204 See id. at 39. 
205. Id. 
206 NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 186. 
207 Id. 
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because “the accomplice inculpates herself in the process.”208  In 
contrast, “snitch testimony lacks even this form of corroboration.”209 
For all these reasons, cross-examination cannot be relied upon to 
ensure that false snitch testimony is not believed or that unreliable 
evidence is not given undue weight by jurors. 
 
B. Postconviction Review of False Jailhouse Snitch Testimony Is Also 
Insufficient. 
 
If cross-examination often proves wholly ineffective in countering 
false jailhouse snitch testimony, the other traditional remedy—
postconviction review—is even more dysfunctional.  First, the same 
structural difficulties that plague efforts to impeach snitches through 
cross-examination are present in a postconviction challenge of snitch 
testimony.  Rarely will evidence be available, postconviction, to prove 
that a jailhouse snitch lied at trial.210  Credibility determinations are 
largely the province of the fact finder and are almost never disturbed 
on review.211  Second, even when reviewing courts do determine that 
a jailhouse informant’s testimony was unreliable, or even plainly 
false, courts rarely grant relief.212 
In one puzzling case, for example, a defendant had been convicted 
and sentenced to life in prison for allegedly participating in the rape 
and murder of a young woman.213  The State’s evidence against the 
defendant was weak.  DNA evidence implicated another man but not 
the defendant.214  The only physical evidence against the defendant 
was a single pubic hair that had been recovered among sixteen others 
from the crime scene.215  The hair was described as a nonexclusive 
match to defendant’s hair type.216  The State conceded by stipulation 
that defendant was excluded as a contributor of any of the other 
fifteen hairs.217  One of these possibly matched another suspect in the 
case.218  The State’s case against the defendant was built on this one 
hair and the testimony of three witnesses.219  The first witness was a 
fourteen-year-old boy, described in a psychological evaluation as 
 
208. Brief of the NACDL, supra note 2, at 3. 
209. Id. 
210 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 86–87 
(2008). 
211 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 641 (2014). 
212 See supra Subpart III.A. 
213. People v. Lopes, No. C041516, 2004 WL 418350, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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having a penchant for lying, who gave inconsistent statements to 
police, only one of which implicated the defendant, and who testified 
at trial that the defendant was not involved in the attack.220  The 
other two witnesses were jailhouse informants.221  The first jailhouse 
informant, a man named Hopkins, testified that the defendant had 
confessed to participating in the attack.222  Hopkins’ credibility was 
dubious; according to the appellate court: 
 
Hopkins admitted to hearing jail guards talking about 
the case, but claimed he heard their conversations 
after he first talked to the police.  He said that 
everyone in jail was talking about what happened in 
defendant’s case.  Hopkins also revealed that he had 
provided testimony in two other special circumstance 
murder cases.  In exchange for his testimony, Hopkins 
had three felony counts dismissed.  His sentence of 
four years ten months on the remaining counts he pled 
guilty to was stayed and he was released from jail.  
Furthermore, Hopkins’s statement that he talked with 
defendant while they worked mornings together at the 
same job in the jail yard was shown to be untrue, as 
defendant never had a morning job.223 
 
A second jailhouse informant named Cooper also testified that 
defendant had admitted participating in the rape and murder.224  But 
as the appellate court pointed out, this informant too had both a 
record of prior cooperation and apparently strong incentives to 
testify.225 
Cooper was in the San Joaquin County jail on warrants for 
charges of possession of precursors with intent to manufacture drugs 
and receiving stolen property plus prior conviction enhancements.226  
Cooper stated he was afraid that if he went to prison he would be 
killed.227  Cooper also had a lengthy record of felony and misdemeanor 
convictions dating to the 1970s and was on probation at the time of 
his testimony.228  In exchange for his testimony, Cooper was allowed 
to serve his time in Humboldt County, where he was placed in an 
 
220 Id. at *1–2. 
221. A fourth witness who knew nothing of the case at bar testified about 
an incident occurring after the attack in which the defendant and others 
allegedly fondled a teenage girl.  Id. at *3. 
222 Id. at *2. 
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alternative work program.229  After two days in that program, Cooper 
left.230  He remained at large until just before the trial, when he was 
arrested on a probation violation and sentenced to thirty days in 
jail.231  When arrested, Cooper gave several fake names and birth 
dates, apparently to avoid arrest on three outstanding felony 
warrants.232  Cooper also admitted he had provided information to the 
police to benefit himself a couple of times in the past.233 
Notwithstanding the obvious flimsiness of the State’s case—
consisting entirely of one nonexclusively matching hair, an 
inconsistent statement from an untrustworthy child, and the 
testimony of two jailhouse snitches, one of whom was caught in a flat 
lie and the other who had obvious incentives to help the State— the 
jury convicted and the appellate court affirmed.234  The appellate 
court reasoned that although there were serious problems with each 
of the witnesses who testified, the witnesses corroborated each 
other.235  The police statement given by the fourteen-year-old with a 
propensity to lie was corroborated by the self-serving and clearly 
perjurious testimony of the jailhouse snitch, and vice versa.236  The 
appellate court seems to have thought that while a small amount of 
untrustworthy evidence might provide an insufficient basis for 
conviction, problems with the reliability of the State’s evidence could 
be overcome by piling on more untrustworthy evidence. 
Sometimes appellate judges simply do not know what to think 
but affirm anyway.  In one Georgia case, a habeas court denied relief 
to a defendant who had been convicted of murder and armed robbery 
almost entirely on the testimony of a jailhouse informant named 
Donald Bates.237  At trial, Bates testified that the defendant Johnny 
Ashley had made a jailhouse confession to him.238  Defense counsel 
for Ashley adduced substantial impeachment evidence on cross-







234 Id. at *1. 
235. Id. at *5. 
236. Id. at *3 (noting that a jailhouse snitch’s “statement that he talked 
with defendant while they worked mornings together at the same job in 
the jail yard was shown to be untrue, as defendant never had a morning 
job”). 
237. Ashley v. State, 439 S.E.2d 914, 915–16 (Ga. 1994). 
238 Id. at 916. 
239. As the court noted on appeal: 
 
During defense counsel's cross-examination of Bates, the 
witness admitted that he had previously given police 
officers false information about the case; that he had 
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conducting extensive postconviction hearings, Ashley’s lawyers put 
on extensive evidence that Bates was mentally ill and had fabricated 
his trial testimony.240 
At the conclusion of the hearing on the matter, the judge summed 
up his thoughts on the matter: 
 
At the trial I thought Donald Bates was lying.  Now I 
think Donald Bates is lying on the trial, but I do not 
think that affects the verdict in the case . . .  I just don’t 
believe prisoners who testify against prisoners to get 
out of jail.  And I don’t think juries do either.  I didn’t 
believe it then; I don’t believe it now.  I don’t think that 
you’ve proved anything about what the truth is, either.  
I don’t think it was what Mr. Bates swore it was and I 
don’t think we know.241 
 
Despite conceding that one of the main witnesses at Ashley’s trial 
was an untrustworthy witness and a blatant liar, the trial court 
denied Ashley’s motion for a new trial, based entirely, it appears, on 
the judge’s conviction that the snitch’s testimony was so obviously 
perjured that members of the jury must have realized it.242  In so 
ruling, the judge failed to take into account several factors that might 
have led a jury to give such testimony credence at trial, including that 
Mr. Bates was the State’s witness whose credibility was defended by 
the prosecutor, that the judge himself had permitted the witness to 
testify in the first place, and that the jury’s verdict itself belied his 
conclusion.  In any event, the court’s ruling was affirmed on appeal.243  
 
been convicted six times for forgery; that he had just been 
released from the mental health unit of a state 
correctional institution; and that he had mental health 
problems and was being treated with Prozac.  Defense 
counsel sought to present testimony from an assistant 
district attorney that, in another murder case, Bates had 
given authorities false information concerning the 
identity of the perpetrator in exchange for favorable 
treatment from the authorities.  The trial court refused 
to allow the evidence after sustaining the State's 
objection that it was irrelevant and collateral. 
 
 Id. 
240 Brief of Appellant, Ashley v. State, 439 S.E.2d 914 (Ga. 1994) (No. 
S93A1989),1993 WL 13035276, at *24–25. 
241. Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Ashley, 439 S.E.2d at 917. 
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Ashley served twenty years in a Georgia prison, and was released on 
parole on January 31, 2012.244 
What is worse, even in cases where jailhouse snitches come 
forward and admit that they lied at trial, courts rarely grant 
defendants postconviction relief.245  This happened, for instance, in 
the Troy Davis case.246  Five years after jailhouse snitch Kevin 
McQueen testified that Davis confessed to shooting police officer 
Mark McPhail, McQueen executed an affidavit recanting his trial 
testimony.247  In the affidavit, McQueen explained that he had heard 
details of the Davis case on television and from other inmates, and he 
had then contacted the detective in charge of the investigation.248  He 
falsely told the detective that Davis had confessed to him and 
repeated the story at trial.249  He also admitted that the charges 
against him had been dropped or reduced as a reward for his 
testimony, a fact that he also lied about at trial.250 
McQueen’s recantation was presented to numerous courts during 
the approximately twenty years that Davis sought to prove that he 
was actually innocent of the murder of the Savannah police officer.251  
Because Davis was deemed to have procedurally defaulted most of his 
legal claims, few courts even addressed the significance of McQueen’s 
recantation.252  When a judge finally did consider the significance of 
the recantation in a habeas hearing conducted to evaluate Davis’s 
actual innocence claim, the judge rejected it as insignificant.253  
According to the judge, McQueen’s trial testimony was so patently 
false that the jury must have been aware of the fact at trial.254  
Therefore, the judge concluded, McQueen’s recantation was both 
 
244 Parole Database, GA. ST. BOARD. PARDONS & PAROLES (Oct. 18, 2011), 
http://www.pap.state.ga.us/ParoleeDatabase/ (search “Inmate Number” for 
“219088”). 
245 See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Convictions Based on Lies: Defining Due 
Process Protection, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 331 (2011). 
246 Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354, 358–59 (Ga. 2008) (affirming a denial of a 
motion for a new trial despite recantations by several prosecution witnesses).  
247 In re Davis, No. CV409–130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *48 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 
2010). 
248 Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 36–37, In re Davis, No. 09CV00130, 2010 
WL 8032222 (S.D. Ga. June 23, 2010). 
249. Id. at 27–30. 
250. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *48. 
251 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Davis v. State, (Ga. 2008) (No. 
08-6), 2008 WL 4366181 (presenting McQueen’s recantations as a reason for the 
Supreme Court of Georgia to reconsider Davis’s conviction). 
252 See, e.g., Davis v. Turpin, 539 S.E.2d 129, 134 (Ga. 2001) (holding that Davis 
had procedurally defaulted on his constitutional claims by failing to raise them on 
direct appeal). 
253 Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *54. 
254 Id. 
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plainly true and inconsequential.255  Davis’ habeas petition was 
denied, and Davis was subsequently executed.256 
Although it took twenty years, a better result was obtained by 
Bobby Joe Maxwell.  Maxwell had been convicted in 1992—largely on 
the testimony of infamous jailhouse snitch Sidney Storch—of 
committing several murders attributed to the “Skid Row Stabber.”257  
Based on extensive evidence, including the testimony given by Storch 
to the Los Angeles County grand jury, that Storch was a serial 
perjurer who had made a living concocting false jailhouse confessions, 
the Ninth Circuit granted Maxwell’s habeas petition in 2012.258  Even 
then, however, the Ninth Circuit was forced to expressly overrule 
factual findings made by the California Superior Court, which had 
concluded, notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of Storch’s 
“pattern of perjury,” that there was no basis in the Maxwell case itself 
to find that Storch’s testimony was false.259 
California sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, 
which was denied over the dissents of Justices Scalia and Alito.260  
Justice Scalia complained that, at best, “the evidence relied on by the 
Ninth Circuit might permit, but by no means compels, the conclusion 
that Storch fabricated Maxwell’s admission.”261  This, Scalia argued, 
was an insufficient basis upon which to grant habeas relief.262  
Writing in support of the Court’s denial of certiorari, Justice 
Sotomayor responded: 
 
The dissent labels all of this evidence “circumstantial.”  
It insists that it is possible that Storch repeatedly 
falsely implicated other defendants, and fabricated 
other material facts at Maxwell’s trial, but 
uncharacteristically told the truth about Maxwell’s 
supposed confession.  Of course, that is possible.  But 
it is not reasonable, given the voluminous evidence 
that Storch was a habitual liar who even the State 
concedes told other material lies at Maxwell’s trial.263 
 
Maxwell’s case does demonstrate that postconviction relief for 
some victims of false jailhouse testimony is possible, but it is the 
exception that proves the rule.  The evidence of Storch’s misconduct 
 
255 Id. at *60. 
256 Id. at *61; Kim Severson, Georgia Inmate Executed; Raised Racial Issues in 
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at A1. 
257. Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 491 (9th Cir. 2010).  
258 Id. at 513. 
259. Id. at 504–05. 
260 Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611, 613 (2012). 
261. Id. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
262 Id. at 615. 
263. Id. at 612 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
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was overwhelming, and Maxwell’s victory seemingly grudging.  
Plainly, postconviction relief for defendants convicted on the basis of 
unreliable or false snitch testimony is technically available but 
practically attainable only in extreme cases, and even then only over 
spirited opposition.  As the state court rulings in Maxwell’s case 
illustrate, busy and jaded state appellate courts typically look the 
other way in the presence of even blatant evidence that jailhouse 
snitches lied at a criminal defendant’s trial, and sentiment in favor of 
upholding those determinations exists in some quarters all the way 
up the judicial chain of command.264 
This anecdotal evidence is supported by more systematic 
research.  Professor Brandon Garrett conducted a study of the first 
200 DNA exonerations.265  In those cases, Garrett found that jailhouse 
informant testimony had been a factor in 11.5 percent of the cases.266  
Jailhouse informants provided testimony in forty-three percent of the 
capital cases that ultimately ended in exoneration.267  Strikingly, not 
one of those wrongly convicted defendants attempted to challenge 
their convictions based on a claim that the jailhouse informant had 
fabricated testimony, likely, as Garrett surmises, “because they could 
not locate any evidence to prove that the informants testified 
falsely.”268  Reviewing the record of relief granted in cases involving 
false jailhouse snitch testimony, it is abundantly clear that wrongly 
convicted defendants cannot rely on postconviction processes for 
relief.  As Anne Bowen Poulin has argued, “When false testimony is 
given at trial the truth finding process is fundamentally corrupted.”269  
The courts’ routine failure to grant relief to defendants who establish 
that jailhouse snitches presented false testimony at trial deserves 
prompt and effective relief, but such relief, sadly, for most has simply 
not been forthcoming. 
 
IV.REGULATION OF JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY SHORT OF ABOLITION 
IS CERTAIN TO BE INEFFECTIVE 
 
A wide variety of commentators have condemned jailhouse snitch 
testimony for many of the reasons noted here.270  They have proposed 
 
264. But see, e.g., Ex Parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2014) (denying habeas relief despite false witness testimony on the 
grounds that said testimony was immaterial to the verdict). 
265 Garrett, supra note 210, at 64. 
266.Id. at 86. 
267.Id. at 93. 
268.Id. at 86–87. 
269.Poulin, supra note 245, at 334. 
 270.  See, e.g., THE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 15; Alexandra 
Natapoff, Comment, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to 
Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 107–29 
(2006); David Protess, A Tale of Two Snitches, THE HUFFINGTON 
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a variety of reforms, including enhanced disclosure requirements to 
ensure vigorous cross-examination of jailhouse informants, pretrial 
reliability hearings, special jury instructions, using experts to 
educate the jury about the effect of incentives on the reliability of 
testimony, and heightened corroboration requirements.271  Few, 
however, have vigorously called for an outright ban on use of 
electronically uncorroborated jailhouse snitch testimony.272  As I 
argue here, however, nothing less than a total ban on such testimony 
will be effective. 
 
A. Pretrial Reliability Hearings Are Unlikely To Adequately 
Screen Out Lying Jailhouse Snitches. 
 
Some commentators have proposed conducting pretrial reliability 
hearings to screen out unreliable jailhouse snitch testimony.273  
Leading snitch expert Alexandra Natapoff, for example, urges courts 
to conduct pretrial reliability hearings for all informant witnesses, 
including jailhouse snitches that the government intends to present 
at trial.274  In such hearings, the government would have the burden 
to demonstrate “the reliability of any informant witness, or 
statements made by that informant.”275  Moreover, as she points out, 
at least three states have already established pretrial reliability 
hearings for jailhouse snitches.276  Proponents argue that such 
hearings fall well within the comfort zone of trial courts, which 
 
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-protess/reynaldo-
guevara_b_3397012.html (last updated Aug. 10, 2013, 5:12 AM). 
271. See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 192–99; Harris, supra note 78, 
at 49–58. 
272. The authors of a 2007 PEW Charitable Trust study on jailhouse 
snitches, for instance, condemned their use but advocated a set of 
reforms, including corroboration, “pretrial disclosures, reliability 
hearings, and special jury instructions” instead of a categorical ban.  THE 
JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2.  Rory Little has urged a categorical 
exclusion of six types of unreliable evidence most frequently linked to 
wrongful convictions, including jailhouse informant testimony, in capital 
cases.  See Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources of Wrongful 
Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital Statutes, 37 
SW. U. L. REV. 965, 968–69 (2008).  Other occasional calls for a total ban 
have been made.  See, e.g., Robert M. Bloom, Jailhouse Informants, 18 
A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. 20, 78 (2003) (“The best way to deal with 
perjured testimony is to exclude it, and in light of the evidence that 
testimony from a jailhouse informant is so often false, it, too, should be 
subject to exclusion.”). 
273. See, e.g., DWYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 157; Harris, supra note 78, 
at 61–62. 
274. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 194. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 194–95 (identifying Illinois, Oklahoma, and Nevada as 
mandating pretrial reliability hearings for jailhouse informant 
testimony); see D’Agostino v. State, 823 P.2d 283, 285 (Nev. 1991); Dodd 
v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). 
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regularly are asked to screen other types of evidence, such as 
scientific evidence and expert witness testimony, for reliability.277 
Professor George Harris has also proposed that courts undertake 
extensive pretrial reliability hearings of any compensated witness, 
including jailhouse snitches.278  Harris suggests that evidence at such 
hearings would include anything relevant to the witness’s credibility, 
including the “nature of compensation that the witness has received 
or may receive,” the witness’s history of cooperation in other cases, 
and physical or other evidence “unknown to the witness at the time 
of her initial proffer of testimony, that is consistent with or 
contradicts the cooperator’s testimony” in specific and unanticipated 
ways.279  “Changed testimony, a history of repeated cooperation for 
compensation, compensation out of proportion to the government’s 
legitimate interest in the prosecution of the defendant, or overtly 
contingent compensation should create a presumption of insufficient 
reliability that the moving party would have to overcome.”280 
Although adoption of a pretrial reliability screening requirement 
would not be a bad thing, and might even be moderately helpful, the 
proposed pretrial reliability screenings would certainly not be a 
panacea.  Indeed, there is little reason to believe that trial courts have 
the ability or inclination to screen out false jailhouse snitch testimony 
in the mine run of cases. 
For starters, judges are unlikely to be any better than jurors at 
distinguishing lying witnesses from honest ones.281  Numerous 
studies have examined the extent to which training and expertise 
improves one’s ability to assess whether others are telling the 
truth.282  Police officers in particular have been the focus of many of 
these studies because they regularly interview suspects and evaluate 
the credibility of the stories they are told.283  Without exception, those 
studies have found that “people are poor intuitive judges of truth and 
deception, and that police investigators and other so-called experts 
 
277. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 195; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–90 (1993). 
278. Harris, supra note 78, at 63–64. 
279. Id. at 63. 
280. Id. at 64–65. 
281. See, e.g., Schauer & Spellman, supra note 178, at 19 (noting the 
“mistaken belief that judges and juries are competent evaluators of the 
veracity of those who are offering [direct evidence] testimony”). 
282. Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, “I'm Innocent!”: Effects of 
Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation 
Room, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 501 (1999) (internal citations 
omitted); see also Gary D. Bond, Deception Detection Expertise, 32 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 339, 339 (2008) (citing research studies finding that 
subjects were generally unable to identify lies at a rate greater than 
chance). 
283. See Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “He’s Guilty!”: 
Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 469, 471 (2002).   
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who routinely make such judgments are also highly prone to error.”284  
Indeed, some studies indicate that specialized training might make 
interviewers more likely to misinterpret the truthfulness of the 
interviewee and to increase the interviewer’s confidence in those 
misjudgments.285  If police investigators—who often receive special 
training in interrogation skills and lie detection—have not 
demonstrated any measurable advantage in detecting deception, 
there is little reason to believe judges—who deal with individuals at 
far greater remove—have developed any better abilities. 
Like police officers, judges actually might be more poorly 
equipped than jurors to fairly evaluate the credibility of a jailhouse 
snitch’s incriminating testimony, and confirmation bias again may be 
the culprit. Research on judge and juror perceptions of guilt indicates 
that judges are more likely to view criminal defendants as guilty than 
jurors.286  In Kalven and Zeisel’s classic study of jury behavior, for 
example, the researchers found that judges were consistently more 
likely than juries to vote to convict.287  Other researchers have found 
“similar patterns of trial judges unduly leaning in the prosecution’s 
favor when appraising the evidence.”288 Due to the volume of 
apparently guilty criminal defendants that judges see regularly in 
their courtrooms, judges may similarly be more strongly disinclined 
to question the accuracy of the jailhouse snitch’s testimony, which 
confirms what the judge likely assumes anyway: that the defendant 
is guilty.   
Pro-prosecution bias by judges has been frequently noted in other 
contexts as well.  For instance, judicial tolerance of police perjury is 
widely acknowledged.289  Courts know that police frequently lie but 
tend to look the other way.290  A variety of scholars have concluded 
that trial judges “habitually accept[] the policeman’s word” and may 
even ignore police lies “to prevent the suppression of evidence and 
 
284. Kassin & Fong, supra note 282, at 500–01; see also Bella M. DePaulo 
et al., The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception, 
1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 346, 346 (1997). 
285. DePaulo et al., supra note 284. 
286. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 
55–59 (Phoenix ed., 1971); Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, 
Reflections On Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of 
Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 562–63 
(1998). 
287. KALVEN, JR. & ZEISEL, supra note 286; see also Guggenheim & 
Hertz, supra note 286 (discussing research). 
288. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 286, at 568. 
289. Melanie D. Wilson, Improbable Cause: A Case for Judging 
Police by a More Majestic Standard, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 
267–68 (2010). 
290. Id. at 267 (citing studies that conclude judges “knowingly 
acquiesce in police perjury so that they too avoid letting a guilty 
defendant escape prosecution”). 
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assure conviction.”291  At least one research study lends empirical 
credence to that hypothesis.292  One commentator summarized the 
most frequently advanced explanations for why judges so frequently 
fail to crack down on police perjury: 
 
1) it is impossible to determine if a witness is lying; 2) 
judges dislike the possibility of suppressing evidence 
due to police perjury; 3) many judges believe that most 
defendants in the system are guilty; 4) judges are more 
likely to believe an officer’s testimony rather than the 
defendant’s; and 5) judges do not enjoy accusing other 
government officials of lying.293 
 
The reasons judges are reluctant to make credibility 
determinations against police are also applicable to jailhouse snitches 
in that adverse credibility findings might also impugn the motives or 
integrity of the prosecutors who put the snitches on the witness stand.  
In many cases there will be little external basis on which to assess 
the credibility of a jailhouse snitch’s testimony.  Because of pro-
prosecution bias, judges may be more inclined to permit prosecutors 
to put on potentially unreliable evidence, particularly because such 
evidence confirms the possible judicial assumption that most 
defendants are, in fact, guilty.  While judges are unlikely to be 
inclined to specially credit an inmate’s testimony under most 
circumstances, they may be more willing to credit such testimony 
where it has been previously vetted—or at least apparently vetted—
by law enforcement officials.  Finally, just as judges are often 
reluctant to accuse police officers of lying, they probably are also 
reluctant to make an adverse credibility determination against a 
witness for whom the prosecutor has—expressly or implicitly—
personally vouched.  After all, a judicial determination that such a 
witness is lying at minimum suggests that the prosecutor who put 
that witness on the stand was negligent in proffering the evidence, 
and could even imply that the prosecutor knowingly attempted to use 
false testimony. 
That judges tend, for whatever reason, to be biased when 
assessing the admissibility of evidence is further supported by the 
judicial track record in screening scientific evidence.  As Professor 
Suzanne Rozelle has argued, a study of evidentiary challenges in 
criminal cases reveals a clear pattern of pro-prosecution admissibility 
 
291. Id. at 265. 
292. Id. at 264–65 (studying judicial resolution of claims of police perjury 
brought by criminal defendants). 
293. See Jennifer E. Koepke, Note, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall 
of Silence: The Circling of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 
WASHBURN L.J. 211, 222 (2000) (summarizing reasons that judges are 
reluctant to find police perjury). 
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rulings.294  Courts readily admit all sorts of questionable forensic 
“match” evidence proffered by prosecutors, including tool mark, bite 
mark, footprint, and handwriting comparisons, that lack any 
scientific foundation regarding the reliability of the method or the 
proficiency of the analyst.295  At the same time, those same courts 
routinely deny defendants’ requests to put on expert witnesses to 
testify about the known unreliability of that evidence, even where 
such testimony is grounded in empirical research.296  This pro-
prosecution bias strongly suggests that judges will conduct pretrial 
reliability screenings of jailhouse snitch testimony in the same one-
sided manner. 
In sum, most judges’ laissez-faire attitudes about state witnesses 
provides little reason to expect that if given the opportunity to 
conduct pretrial hearings, judges will suddenly crack down on 
unreliable jailhouse snitches. 
 
B. Disclosure of Impeachment Material 
 
A small number of states require prosecutors to comply with 
enhanced disclosure obligations in certain types of cases involving 
jailhouse informants.297  As a result of recent reforms, for example, 
Illinois prosecutors must now disclose a substantial amount of 
information about informants, including any benefit promised to the 
informant in exchange for testimony, the circumstances in which the 
defendant’s alleged confession supposedly occurred, names of 
witnesses present at the time, and the informant’s prior history of 
cooperation with the State.298  Oklahoma and Nebraska also require 
enhanced pretrial disclosure.299  Oklahoma’s Court of Criminal 
Appeals recently established disclosure rules applicable to jailhouse 
snitch testimony in all cases.300  According to the Oklahoma Court, at 
least ten days prior to trial the State must disclose the informant’s 
criminal history, any deal or promise extended to the informant, the 
circumstances in which the admission or confession was obtained, 
other cases in which the informant has testified and any benefits 
received as a result, any statements recanting his statement or 
testimony, and any other information relevant to the informant’s 
credibility.301  This impeachment evidence is undoubtedly necessary 
to permit defense counsel to better cross-examine informants.  For 
 
294. See Susan D. Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: Criminal Defendants 
and the Short End of the Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV. 597, 606 (2007). 
295. Id. at 599–600. 
296. Id. 
297 GARRETT, supra note 1, at 256. 
298. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 115-21(c) (1993). 
299 NATAPOFF, supra note 3. 
300. See Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). 
301. Id. 
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these reasons, numerous commentators have called for increased 
disclosure obligations along similar lines.302 
There may, however, be inherent limits on the extent to which 
disclosure rules can mitigate the likely prejudice resulting from 
admission of unreliable jailhouse snitch testimony.  First, no matter 
how scathing the impeachment, jurors all begin with the knowledge 
that jailhouse snitches are convicted criminals.  Notwithstanding 
that knowledge, jurors routinely believe snitch testimony anyway.  
Second, as George Harris has noted, most of the critical details 
surrounding a jailhouse informant’s testimony, including how the 
government “selects, prepares, and evaluates” such witnesses, are 
“undiscoverable,” and “[e]ven that which is discoverable often 
remains resistant to realistic portrayal at trial.”303  More likely, 
however, the critical information will simply never be uncovered.  
“Given the secrecy surrounding the prosecutor’s preparation of her 
witnesses and the inability to review the process meaningfully, it is 
virtually impossible to ascertain whether and to what extent 
witnesses have been coached by prosecutors and police to give false or 
misleading testimony.”304  In addition, many types of benefits that 
prosecutors can bestow on jailhouse informants—such as a promise 
not to bring future charges or to bring lesser charges rather than 
greater charges—are protected under the guise of prosecutorial 
discretion and insulated from discovery.305 
There are additional reasons why enhanced discovery will not 
resolve the jailhouse snitch problem.  Perhaps most importantly, in 
many cases there simply will be little to disclose.  When an inmate 
comes forward purporting to possess incriminating information, the 
State can truthfully claim that it had nothing to do with initiating 
contact with the witness.  It simply received the evidence that the 
witness reported, found it credible, and proffered it at trial.  The 
fundamental question—whether the informant is truthful or lying—
will remain for the jury to determine.  Because no formal deal will 
actually have been made in most cases prior to the witness’s in-court 
testimony, there also will be nothing to disclose regarding any benefit 
or inducement offered by the State in exchange for the testimony.  
When questioned about whether the witness has received a benefit, 
the witness can honestly state that he has not.  He might add, as 
witnesses frequently and honestly do, that he hopes the prosecutor or 
judge will look favorably upon him in the future as a result of his 
 
302. See NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 192; Harris, supra note 78, at 62 
(calling for enhanced discovery requirements in cases of all cooperating 
witnesses, including electronic recording of all ex parte discussions with 
the cooperator). 
303. Harris, supra note 78, at 53. 
304. Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching By Prosecutors, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 829, 833 (2002).  
305 Harris, supra note 78, at 53. 
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testimony, because the prosecutor has never made any explicit 
promise to reward him, and because the prosecutor has only asked 
him to testify “truthfully” about what he knows. 
Enhanced disclosure is an inadequate remedy for another, and 
perhaps even more basic, reason.  Precisely in those cases in which 
jailhouse snitch testimony is likely to be most sought out, prosecutors 
cannot be trusted to fairly and honestly disclose the critical facts that 
would undermine the snitch’s testimony.306  If police or prosecutors 
have affirmatively provided essential details about a case to a 
jailhouse snitch they know to be untrustworthy, have made secret 
promises to reward witnesses for their testimony in the future, or 
have recruited the snitch—in violation of the Sixth Amendment—to 
affirmatively elicit incriminating information against a fellow 
inmate, then no formal disclosure requirement will induce the 
prosecutor to disclose such damning information. 
Finally, even if a disclosure requirement did result in discovery 
of important impeachment evidence that defense counsel could use at 
trial to impeach the witness, it is not clear that witness impeachment 
alone is sufficient to blunt the prejudice caused by testimony that the 
defendant has confessed to the crime.  As discussed above, research 
suggests that while jurors have the capacity to recognize that some 
witnesses are more self-interested than others, such information does 
not necessarily get processed in a way that helps defendants.  Due to 
the stickiness of fundamental attribution error, jurors are still more 
likely to vote to convict, particularly in close cases, after hearing even 




Another suggestion made by commentators is to apply 
heightened corroboration requirements to jailhouse snitch 
testimony.307  Indeed, the American Bar Association passed a 
resolution “calling on federal, state, and local governments to adopt 
measures so ‘no prosecution should occur based solely upon 
uncorroborated jailhouse informant testimony.’”308  These 
 
 306. As one commentator noted, “[t]he likelihood of fabrication 
resulting from bargained-for testimony is simply too great to rely on a 
prosecutor's honor and good faith in meeting his discovery obligations” 
with respect to incentivized witnesses.  Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1176. 
307. Cf. Christine J. Saverda, Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for 
Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785, 798 (1990) (arguing 
that corroboration requirements should apply for all compensated 
informants). 
308. See ABA Res. 108(b), adopted by the House of Delegates (Feb. 15, 2005), 
available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/hous
e_of_delegates/108b_2011_my.authcheckdam.pdf.  Defendants have 
argued for adoption of corroboration requirements unsuccessfully in 
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recommendations recently have been implemented in a few states, 
including Texas309 and California,310 which have enacted legislation 
to require corroboration of jailhouse informants’ testimony.311 
Jailhouse snitch corroboration requirements are often modeled 
on similar corroboration requirements for accomplice testimony.312  
While these reforms are laudable for what they are worth, they 
simply are not worth that much.  The main problem with a 
corroboration requirement is that, as typically formulated, it is too 
lax.  Under Texas law, for example, “all that is required is that there 
be some evidence—other than the jailhouse informant’s testimony—
which tends to connect the accused to the commission of the 
offense.”313  California’s requirement is somewhat more stringent.  In 
California, it is not enough if the corroborating evidence merely 
“tends to connect” the defendant to the crime.314  Rather, the 
corroborating evidence must, in fact, “connect[] the defendant with 
the commission of the offense.”315  Accomplice testimony, however, 
can be corroborated by jailhouse snitch testimony, and vice versa, 
substantially weakening the protective value of the corroboration 
requirement.316  Jailhouse snitches can also presumably be 
corroborated by other jailhouse snitches.317 
 
some states.  See, e.g., State v. Walker, 82 A.3d 630, 635 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2013); see also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: 
FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 63 (Paul C. Giannelli & 
Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) (urging reforms of state rules regarding 
jailhouse informants). 
309. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.075 (West 2014). 
310. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111.5 (Deering 2008). 
311 Id. (“The testimony of an in-custody informant shall be corroborated by other 
evidence that connects the defendant with the commission of the offense, the 
special circumstance, or the evidence offered in aggravation to which the in-
custody informant testifies.”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.075 (“A 
defendant may not be convicted of an offense on the testimony of a person . . . 
imprisoned or confined in the same correctional facility as the defendant unless the 
testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with 
the offense committed.”). 
312 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111.5, with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111 
(Deering 2008). 
313. Hernandez v. State, No. 03-10-00863-CR, 2013 WL 3723203, at *4 
(Tex. App. July 11, 2013); see also Gill v. State, 873 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1994). 
314  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111. 
315. Id.; see People v. Davis, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1484, 1490 (2013). 
316. See, e.g., People v. Washington, Nos. A118349, A123088, 2009 WL 
714512, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2009) (citing People v. Williams, 940 
P.2d 710, 772 (Cal. 1997)); Ramirez v. State, 754 S.E.2d 325, 327 (Ga. 
2014). 
317. See, e.g., Whitley v. Ercole, 725 F. Supp. 2d 398, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(affirming conviction based on testimony of jailhouse informant where 
informant’s testimony was corroborated by other jailhouse informants). 
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Other states rely on the “corpus delicti” rule to enforce a more 
modest corroboration requirement.  In Tennessee, for instance, “the 
corpus delicti of a crime may not be established by a confession 
alone.”318  Accordingly, a conviction may not be sustained if the only 
evidence in the case is testimony by a jailhouse informant.  The corpus 
delicti rule, however, provides even weaker protection against lying 
jailhouse snitches.  In Tennessee, for example, as long as the 
prosecutor can prove that a crime in fact occurred, the corpus delicti 
rule will not bar the State from relying solely on jailhouse informant 
testimony to establish that a particular individual was the crime’s 
perpetrator.319 
Even where the corroboration requirement has some teeth, it will 
rarely make much of a difference.  In the vast majority of cases in 
which jailhouse snitch testimony is sought, there will be at least some 
other evidence implicating the defendant.320  In those cases, however, 
prosecutors want to use the jailhouse snitches for precisely the reason 
that they should not be allowed to do so: the other evidence in the case 
is weak or equivocal, making the jailhouse snitch testimony unduly 
influential in determining the outcome of the case.321  After all, there 
is no reason to use jailhouse snitch testimony—and to reward 
convicted criminals for providing it—if the State has sufficient other 
evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is only in cases 
where the prosecutor believes there to be a real risk of acquittal that 
the prosecutor will be willing to “pay” the price for such testimony.322 
 
318. State v. Churchwell, No. M2011-00950-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 
430118, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2013) (citing Ashby v. State, 139 
S.W. 872 (1911)). 
 319.  See id. (holding that the bodies of shooting victims established 
that a criminal offense had occurred, and therefore the corpus delicti rule 
was not violated by admission of a jailhouse informant testimony that 
the defendant confessed to the crime).  Connecticut makes corroboration 
of a jailhouse snitch’s testimony a factor in determining whether a failure 
to instruct the jury about the potential unreliability of a jailhouse 
informant was harmless error.  See State v. Ebron, 975 A.2d 17, 29 (Conn. 
2009); State v. Arroyo, 973 A.2d 1254, 1262–63 (Conn. 2009). 
320 Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are 
Not Innocents: Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a 
Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 519, 551–52 (2009). 
321 Id. 
322. At the same time, cases in which the only evidence against a 
defendant is jailhouse snitch testimony—though they certainly exist—
are likely to be highly disfavored by prosecutors.  After all, even jurors 
prone to be misled by fundamental attribution error will be hard-pressed 
to convict a defendant where there is absolutely no other evidence of guilt 
than the uncorroborated say-so of a single jailhouse snitch.  I say a single 
snitch here advisedly, because in California, at least, jailhouse snitch 
testimony provided by two different snitches will satisfy the 
corroboration requirement, as long as the snitches did not have an 
opportunity to conspire among themselves.  See  CAL. PENAL CODE § 
1111.5 (Deering 2008). 
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These corroboration rules do little to prevent wrongful 
convictions from occurring in the types of cases in which jailhouse 
snitches are typically used.  Prosecutors will rarely move forward in 
cases where there is no evidence at all connecting a defendant to a 
charged crime, and as long as there is some other evidence, even if it 
is quite weak, then the corroboration requirement will not prevent 
the snitch’s testimony from coming in. 
Perhaps a truly robust corroboration rule would make a 
difference.  For instance, reliability would not be a significant problem 
under a rule that permitted jailhouse snitch testimony to come in only 
if the alleged confession made to the snitch had been electronically 
recorded.  In that case, the snitch’s testimony would be corroborated 
by the taped recording of the conversation.  Of course, such a rule 
would raise other problems—most significantly, Sixth Amendment 
concerns—that would preclude snitches from being used to secretly 
record confessions by other inmates in most cases.323 
Given the substantial concerns, however, that police officers and 
prosecutors might provide jailhouse informants with crucial details 
about the investigation—inadvertently or otherwise—even a strong 
corroboration requirement that did not actually require electronic 
recording would fail to provide sufficient protection.  First, there is 
documented evidence that law enforcement agents have provided 
informants with incriminating details in some cases.324  More 
generally, research on false confessions demonstrates that even police 
officers and prosecutors acting entirely in good faith can, and have, 
inadvertently revealed supposedly secret details to interrogated 
suspects during the course of interrogation.325  Judges and juries then 
concluded that those confessions were reliable precisely because they 
included details about which only the perpetrator of the crime 
supposedly could know.326  Corroboration of the “details” of the 
suspect’s confession, in these cases, actually served to bolster the false 
confessions.327 Courts uniformly emphasized that these confessions 
 
323. The Sixth Amendment bars the State from “deliberately eliciting”—
either directly or through its agents—incriminating statements from 
criminal defendants.  See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986); 
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980).  However, the 
prohibition only applies with respect to crimes as to which the defendant 
has been charged.  See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 163 (2001). 
324. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 27–28. 
325 Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1051, 1053 (2010). 
326. Id. at 1113 (examining dozens of exonerations involving false 
confessions and finding that “[i]n many cases . . . police likely disclosed 
[critical] details during interrogations by telling exonerees how the crime 
happened”). 
327 Id. at 1118. 
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contained admissions that only the true murderer or rapist could 
have known.328 
While recording the entirety of the interrogation might have 
revealed the source of contamination, anything less only further 
cemented its persuasiveness.329  The same dynamic almost certainly 
would be at work in cases involving jailhouse snitches.  A mandatory 
requirement that all conversations between a snitch and state agents 
be recorded, as some commentators have urged,330 would address 
some aspects of the problem, but given the variety of possible sources 
of information from which a jailhouse snitch can potentially draw, 
only a tape recording of the defendant’s actual confession to the snitch 
would adequately ensure that the snitch’s testimony was reliable. 
 
D. Jury instructions 
 
Commentators have also called for juries to be instructed about 
the special reliability concerns present when jailhouse informants 
testify.331  A few states have adopted such requirements.332  While 
requiring special jury instructions is harmless, it is, like the other 
measures discussed above, almost certainly an insufficient remedy.  
The problems with jury instructions are well documented.  A wealth 
of data suggests that jury instructions are generally ineffective tools 




330. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 1, at 247.  Some jurisdictions already 
require such procedures.  In Los Angeles County, for example, “the 
District Attorney's office . . . requires tape-recording of all interviews with 
jailhouse informants and preservation of these recordings, as well as any 
other records of interaction and use of jailhouse informants.”  Handy, 
supra note 29, at 760; see also Gershman, supra note 304, at 861–62; 
Mosteller, supra note 320, at 560–61, 560 n.193. 
331. See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 197.  
332. California is one such state.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127a(b) (West 
2004) (requiring courts to instruct the jury on in-custody informant 
testimony).  Other states include Montana and Oklahoma, which require 
special jury instructions on informant credibility when a jailhouse 
informant testifies.  See State v. Grimes, 982 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Mont. 
1999); Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).  Some 
states require cautionary jury instructions only where a jailhouse 
informant’s testimony lacks corroboration.  See People v. Petschow, 119 
P.3d 495, 504 (Colo. App. 2004); State v. James, No. 96-CA-17, 1998 WL 
518135, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1998); State v. Spiller, No. 00-2897-
CR, 2001 WL 1035213, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2001). 
333. See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob & Hershi M. Kirshenbaum, Some 
Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act upon 
an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 91–95 (1972) (finding that mock jurors who 
learned of a defendant’s prior convictions were more likely to convict 
regardless of whether they received instructions to disregard the prior 
convictions).  But see David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and 
the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. 407, 423–39 (2013) (reviewing 
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First, jurors generally are poor at understanding traditional jury 
instructions or applying those instructions in deliberations.334  
Second, studies using mock jurors have consistently shown that 
instructions to disregard relevant evidence do not prevent jurors from 
incorporating that evidence into deliberations.335  Studies of the 
efficacy of cautionary instructions are also at best mixed.336  There is 
thus substantial reason to doubt that such instructions will prove 
effective in inoculating jurors after exposure to false jailhouse snitch 
testimony.  Indeed, like with unreliable confession evidence 
generally, it is far more likely that such instructions “occur too late in 
the process to undo the damage” once the testimony “has entered the 
stream of evidence at trial.”337  Where evidence as potentially 
prejudicial as a reported postcrime confession is at issue, cautionary 
jury instructions—while undoubtedly better than nothing—are 
simply inadequate to ensure that innocent criminal defendants 
receive a fair trial. 
There is, in short, no reason to believe that jury instructions are 
an effective tool to neutralize the impact of highly prejudicial false 
snitch testimony.  Relying on jury instructions to redress the harm 
inflicted from false jailhouse snitch testimony is like applying a Band-
Aid to a gunshot wound.  It merely obscures the problem. 
 
empirical studies and concluding that “evidentiary instructions work, 
albeit imperfectly”). 
334. Sara Gordon, Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the 
Application of “Plain-Language” Jury Instructions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 
645 (2013) (reporting that “studies have almost universally returned 
results finding that, by and large, jurors are confused by jury instructions 
and often disregard them”). 
335. See, e.g., Thomas R. Carretta & Richard L. Moreland, The Direct and 
Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 280, 
291 (1983) (reporting that mock jurors presented with inadmissible 
evidence were more likely to convict than jurors not presented with the 
evidence notwithstanding judicial instructions to disregard it); Lisa 
Eichorn, Note, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to 
Disregard Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 347 (1989); Saul Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers, 
Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the Jury: 
Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046 (1997) (finding that mock jurors exposed to 
incriminating evidence were more likely to view the defendant as guilty 
than jurors not exposed to that evidence notwithstanding instructions to 
ignore it). 
336. Cindy E. Laub et al., Can the Courts Tell an Ear From an Eye? Legal 
Approaches to Voice Identification Evidence, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 
119, 156 (2013) (evaluating research on cautionary instructions 
regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony); see also Sklansky, 
supra note 333, at 429. 
337. Richard A. Leo et al., Promoting Accuracy in the Use of Confession 
Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to Prevent 
Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 823 (2013). 
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Indeed, even if all of the above requirements were in place, there 
would still be no reason for confidence that false jailhouse snitch 
testimony might not be admitted and relied upon by jurors to convict 
innocent defendants.  Observations made by scholars writing about a 
similar problem—the admissibility of unreliable expert forensic 
witness testimony—apply equally to jailhouse snitch testimony: 
“Experimental research . . . reinforces the need for incriminating [] 
evidence to be reliable because the various trial safeguards, along 
with lay jurors, trial, and appellate judges, have not performed well 
in response to prosecutions and convictions incorporating unreliable 
[] evidence.”338 
Jailhouse snitch testimony is fundamentally and pervasively 
unreliable.  Its use poses an irremediable threat of taint in criminal 
cases. 
 
E. ABOLITION IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE REMEDY 
 
Abolition of jailhouse snitch testimony is perhaps a radical 
suggestion.  After all, courts are extremely reluctant to bar use of 
relevant evidence in general, and even more so to exclude an entire 
class of potentially material evidence altogether.  Nonetheless, there 
is precedent for such a ban.  Indeed, several types of evidence are now 
considered so lacking in reliability that they are flatly banned as 
admissible in-court evidence.  Moreover, it is increasingly clear that 
nothing less than a total ban can protect innocent criminal 
defendants from the substantial risk of wrongful conviction as a 
result of the use, and abuse, of jailhouse snitch testimony. 
 
A. Constitutional precedents: coerced confessions 
 
Coerced confessions are the paradigmatic example of a type of 
evidence that has been barred as a matter of law from use in criminal 
trials.339  Although there are constitutional considerations at play in 
the taking as well as the use of coerced confessions, the ban on the 
use of coerced confessions can be traced, in substantial measure, to 
the inherent unreliability of such evidence.340 
The voluntary confession requirement is a longstanding common-
law evidence rule that ultimately took on constitutional significance 
in the United States.341  The rule is premised on the presumption that 
freely made confessions are strongly reliable, but that confessions 
 
338. Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the 
Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science and Medical Evidence, 61 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 343, 366–67 (2011). 
339 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964). 
340. Id. at 386 (1964). 
341 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 
574 (1884). 
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induced through promises or threats lack such indicia of reliability.342  
The Arizona v. Fulminante case reflects the Supreme Court’s most 
recent recognition of both the inherent unreliability of coerced 
confessions and the difficulty of repairing the prejudice done to 
defendants when such evidence is erroneously admitted.343  It is 
perhaps noteworthy that Fulminante, though widely invoked as a 
coerced confessions case, is also a jailhouse snitch case.344  In 
Fulminante, the defendant was suspected of killing his eleven-year-
old stepdaughter.345  While in jail for an unrelated offense, 
Fulminante allegedly made statements to a fellow inmate implicating 
him in the killing.346  After the inmate reported the statements to the 
FBI, the inmate was instructed to “find out more.”347  As a suspected 
child murderer, Fulminante was being threatened by other prisoners 
and was deeply concerned for his safety.348  The inmate “offered to 
protect Fulminante from his fellow inmates, but told him, ‘You have 
to tell me about it,’ you know. I mean, in other words, ‘For me to give 
you any help.’”349  Fulminante then allegedly admitted to the inmate 
 
342. As the Supreme Court long ago observed: 
 
But the presumption upon which weight is given to 
such evidence, namely, that one who is innocent will 
not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an 
untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears 
to have been made either in consequence of 
inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in 
authority, touching the charge preferred, or because 
of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such 
person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the 
accused, in reference to the charge, deprives him of 
that freedom of will or self-control essential to make 
his confession voluntary within the meaning of the 
law. 
 
Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585. 
343. 499 U.S. at 296. 
344. There was, moreover, some reason to doubt the credibility of 
Sarivola, the jailhouse informant.  Sarivola was associated with the 
Columbo crime family and convicted for loan sharking, extortion, and 
illegal debt-collection practices.  Brief of Respondent at 11, Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1990) (No. 89-839), 2009 WL 507414.  He was 
also a paid informant for the FBI who received payment for relaying 
“incriminating statements from targeted suspects.”  Id.  On one occasion, 
Sarivola produced a fake audio tape containing purportedly 
incriminating statements made by another inmate.  Id. at 12.  He 
ultimately admitted that the tape was a “phony,” but the FBI continued 
to use his services even after learning of the fraud.  Id. at 6–7. 
345 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 282. 
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that he had driven his stepdaughter “to the desert on his motorcycle, 
where he choked her, sexually assaulted her, and made her beg for 
her life, before shooting her twice in the head.”350 
Fulminante moved to suppress the confession on grounds that it 
was the product of coercion.351  The trial court denied the motion, and 
Fulminante was convicted and sentenced to death.352  The Arizona 
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in 
finding that the confession was voluntary and that the error was not 
harmless.353  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
affirmed.354 All nine justices agreed that use of coerced confession 
evidence at trial is per se error.355 
 
“Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the 
jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its 
ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so.”  
While some statements by a defendant may concern 
isolated aspects of the crime or may be incriminating 
only when linked to other evidence, a full confession in 
which the defendant discloses the motive for and 
means of the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon 
that evidence alone in reaching its decision.356 
 
The Court was divided, however, as to whether admission of a 
coerced confession could ever be harmless.357  A five justice majority 
held that harmless error analysis was appropriate even in cases 
where a coerced confession had improperly been admitted at trial, but 
that the error in Fulminante’s case was not harmless.358  Four justices 
dissented from the application of harmless error analysis, contending 
that such evidence was so inherently prejudicial that no trial in which 
such evidence had been presented to a jury could be fair.359 
The Court thus emphasized not only that use of coerced 
confessions was always constitutionally improper, but that any 
harmless error analysis conducted by a court in a case where a 
coerced confession had erroneously been admitted required “extreme 
caution,” since “the risk that the confession is unreliable” is magnified 
 
350. Id. 
351 Id. at 283–84. 
352 Id. at 284. 
353 Id. 
354 Id. at 284–85. 
355 Id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting). 
 356.  Id. at 296 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139–
40 (White, J., dissenting)). 
357 Id. at 288, 295. 
358 Id. at 295, 297. 
359 Id. at 288–90. 
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by the “profound impact” that confession evidence tends to exert upon 
juries.360 
Of course, the constitutional ban on involuntary confessions 
necessitated by due process considerations is accompanied by the 
Fifth Amendment’s ban on compelled self-incriminating testimony.361  
That ban has been further expanded under Miranda v. Arizona362 to 
preclude government use of virtually all statements obtained by 
police during custodial interrogation in a manner inconsistent with 
the procedural safeguards established by the Court.363 
 
B. Procedurally Unreliable Hearsay Evidence 
 
A coerced confession is not the only kind of evidence categorically 
prohibited from use in criminal trials.  The Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause similarly precludes the use, at trial, of a 
particular class of evidence, namely, testimonial out-of-court 
statements that were either made without prior opportunity for cross-
examination or by a currently available declarant.364  The Court’s pre-
Crawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was an express 
reflection of the constitutional importance of evidentiary 
reliability.365  In Ohio v. Roberts,366 the Court construed the 
Confrontation Clause as directed toward the exclusion of out-of-court 
statements made by unavailable witnesses that lack “adequate 
‘indicia of reliability.’”367  Of course, with Crawford, the Court 
reconceptualized its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, 
downplaying mere evidentiary reliability as the touchstone of 
constitutional admissibility of hearsay evidence.368  Instead, the 
Court substituted a procedural standard:  hearsay evidence was 
admissible under the Confrontation Clause only if it was either 
nontestimonial, or if testimonial, only if it had previously been subject 
to cross-examination.369  Nonetheless, the Court was explicit that the 




360. Id. at 296. 
361 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
362 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
363. Id. at 460–61. 
364. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1153 (2011) (holding 
that testimonial evidence is only admissible where cross-examination is 
unavailable). 
365 See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
366 Id. 
367. Id. 
368 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2006). 
369. Id. at 53–56. 
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To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure 
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather 
than a substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in 
a particular manner:  by testing in the crucible of 
cross-examination.  The Clause thus reflects a 
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable 
evidence (a point on which there could be little 
dissent), but about how reliability can best be 
determined.370 
 
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause thus represents a 
longstanding, and well-recognized, constitutional exclusionary 
principle for a class of presumptively unreliable evidence. 
Judges also have the ability, although it is one that is 
infrequently used, to enforce wholesale exclusions on classes of 
evidence deemed insufficiently reliable.371  A court might exclude 
jailhouse informant testimony on grounds that admission of such 
unreliable evidence violates basic Due Process norms.372 
Alternatively, courts might follow the lead established in Jackson 
v. Denno373 and impose stricter constitutional regulation on the use of 
jailhouse snitch testimony.  The defendant in Jackson, Nathan 
Jackson, alleged that his murder confession was the product of 
coercion.374  Pursuant to New York state procedure, the voluntariness 
of Jackson’s confession was submitted, along with all of the other 
evidence, to the jury, which was accordingly instructed that if it found 
that Jackson’s confession had been coerced, it should ignore it.375  
Jackson complained that submission of a coerced confession to the 
jury irreparably tainted the case.376  The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, 
ruling that questions regarding the voluntariness of confessions must 
be adjudicated prior to trial in order, among other things, to ensure 
that jurors do not rely on unreliable involuntary confessions to “serve 
as makeweights in a compromise verdict,” or to prevent jurors from 
 
370. Id. at 61. 
371 See Welsh S. White, Regulating Prison Informers Under the Due Process 
Clause, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 105 (1991). 
372. Cf. id.; see also Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources 
of Wrongful Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital 
Statutes, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 965, 977 (2009) (citing polygraph evidence as 
one longstanding example, and pointing out several categories of 
evidence proven unreliable in wrongful conviction cases, such as junk 
science).  
373. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
374 Id. at 369–70. 
375 Id. at 374–75. 
376 Id. at 376. 
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“accepting the confessions to overcome lingering doubt of guilt 
prejudice.”377 
The logic underlying an expansion of the Jackson rule to 
jailhouse snitch cases is simple.  Like involuntary confessions, 
jailhouse snitch testimony is patently unreliable.  Permitting a snitch 
to testify regarding the substance of an alleged confession is little 
different from permitting a police officer to testify about an allegedly 
coerced confession.  The only difference is the identity of the witness—
and few would argue that the credibility of inherently self-interested 
felons is greater than that of police officers.  Certainly, the logic 
undergirding the Jackson rule, at minimum, counsels for mandatory 
pretrial reliability hearings for contested jailhouse snitch testimony, 
as many commentators have argued and as a few states now require.  
But because—unlike presumably uncoerced confessions made to 
trained and disinterested law enforcement officers—all jailhouse 
confessions are inherently unreliable, it makes far more sense to treat 
those alleged confessions like coerced confessions, requiring not 
merely that they be screened through pretrial reliability hearings, but 
that they be absolutely precluded.378 
 
C. Statutory and Administrative Exclusions 
 
While the federal Constitution bars the use of certain classes of 
presumptively unreliable evidence, such as compelled confessions and 
statements obtained in violation to the Confrontation Clause, still 
other classes of evidence are barred by statute, evidentiary rule, and 
administrative practice.379 
One familiar example is polygraph evidence.  Because of deep-
seated concerns about its reliability, polygraph evidence has been 
banned by statute in many states.380  In virtually every state where 
 
377. Id. at 380 (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1956)). 
378. Of course, judges might also presumptively exclude such evidence 
under Rule 403 on the theory that the probative value of jailhouse snitch 
testimony is outweighed by its prejudicial impact.  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 379.  Indeed, the common exclusion of hearsay and character evidence 
is based on “the fear that certain kinds of admittedly relevant evidence 
will be overvalued by the trier of fact.”  Schauer & Spellman, supra note 
178, at 3. 
 380.  See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-21-701–704 (2009) (holding 
inadmissible all “stress evaluation instrument[s] [administered by law 
enforcement] to test or question individuals for purpose of determining 
and verifying the truth of statements”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 351.1 (West 
2011) (“[T]he results of a polygraph examination . . . shall not be admitted 
into evidence in any criminal proceeding.”).  Such evidence is also 
precluded in military court martials pursuant to Military Rule of 
Evidence 707, which provides, in relevant part: “(a) Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the 
opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, 
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it has not been banned by statute, it has been ruled per se 
inadmissible by courts.381  Such bans are appropriate, the Supreme 
Court has held, because of the State’s “unquestionably . . . legitimate 
interest in ensuring that reliable evidence is presented to the trier of 
fact in a criminal trial.”382  Indeed, the evidence at issue in the famous 
Frye383 case—setting minimum standards for the admissibility of 
scientific evidence—was a polygraph test.384  Although the test for 
admissibility established in Frye has been replaced by the Daubert 
criteria, the ban on polygraph evidence in criminal cases remains 
largely—albeit not entirely—intact.385 
Other types of evidence have also been deemed sufficiently 
unreliable in some jurisdictions that they have been deemed 
categorically inadmissible.  Visual hair analysis, for example, is “a 
kind of evidence so inexact that it is restricted or barred in some 
jurisdictions.”386  Other examples include hypnotically refreshed 
testimony387 and uncorroborated accomplice testimony.388  (Of course, 
all of the flaws of uncorroborated accomplice testimony, and then 
some, exist with respect to uncorroborated jailhouse snitch testimony 
as well.)  Some law enforcement agencies have taken it upon 
themselves to refrain from using or sanctioning the use of certain 
types of unreliable evidence.  The FBI, for instance, stopped 
performing bullet lead analysis after the “National Research Council 
 
failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be 
admitted into evidence.”  MILITARY COMM’N R. EVID. 707. 
 381.  See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 311 (1998) (affirming 
the military’s per se ban on admissibility of polygraph evidence in court 
martial proceedings). 
 382.  Id. at 303. 
383 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 384.  Id. at 1013–14. 
 385. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993); James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation—Polygraph 
Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (1996).  
 386.  James Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2030, 2050 n.84 (2000) (citing Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death 
Row Justice Derailed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at N1). 
 387.  Michael Martin, Admission of Hypnotically Refreshed 
Statements, 214 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1995); Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, 
Admissibility of Hypnotic Evidence at Criminal Trial, 92 A.L.R.3D 442 
(1979). 
 388.  W.J. Dunn, Annotation, Question as to Who Are Accomplices, 
Within Rule Requiring Corroboration of Their Testimony, as One of Law 
or Fact, 19 A.L.R.2D 1352 (1951); see also M.C.D., Annotation, 
Contingency that One May Be Subjected to an Independent Claim or Suit 
Depending on Outcome of Action in Which He Is Called as a Witness as a 
Disqualifying Interest Within Statutes Disqualifying One Person as 
Witness Because of Death of Another, 88 A.L.R. 248 (1934); A.M. 
Swartout, Annotation, Statute Disqualifying One Person as Witness 
Because of Death of Another as Applicable to Executor or Administrator 
of Decedent, 117 A.L.R. 606 (1938). 
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concluded that available data did not support expert testimony 
linking crime bullets to a particular source.”389 
Because of the highly unreliable nature of jailhouse snitch 
testimony, state and federal lawmakers and law enforcement 
agencies can and should, consistent with the treatment of other forms 
of grossly unreliable evidence, ban the use of jailhouse snitch 




Jailhouse snitch testimony is an inherently unreliable type of 
evidence.  Snitches have powerful incentives to invent incriminating 
lies about other inmates in often well-founded hopes that such 
testimony will provide them with material benefits, including in 
many cases substantial reduction of criminal charges or sentences.  
At the same time, false snitch testimony is difficult if not altogether 
impossible to impeach.  Because such testimony usually pits the word 
of two individuals against one another, both of whose credibility is 
suspect, jurors have little ability to accurately or effectively assess or 
weigh the evidence.  Moreover, research suggests that jurors 
frequently succumb to fundamental attribution error and unwittingly 
fail to properly discount the reliability of evidence supplied by biased 
and self-interested witnesses.  Unreliability concerns are further 
magnified because jailhouse snitch testimony is almost exclusively a 
species of confession evidence, and ample research demonstrates that 
confession evidence is more persuasive to jurors than any other type 
of evidence.   
Although some jurisdictions have placed a few modest limits on 
jailhouse snitch testimony, no jurisdiction has banned such testimony 
outright.  It continues to be assumed that the traditional tools of trial 
procedure—cross-examination and postconviction review—are 
adequate to screen out unreliable evidence and safeguard defendants’ 
rights.  These methods, however, are plainly insufficient, as mounting 
evidence of wrongful convictions brought about through the use of 
 
 389.  Laurel Gilbert, Comment, Sharpening the Tools of an Adequate 
Defense: Providing for the Appointment of Experts for Indigent 
Defendants in Child Death Cases Under Ake v. Oklahoma, 50 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 469, 482 (2013); see FBI Press Release, FBI Laboratory 
Announces Discontinuation of Bullet Lead Examinations, FED. BUREAU 
INVESTIGATION (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-
releases/fbi-laboratory-announces-discontinuation-of-bullet-lead-
examinations. 
 390.  A bill to bar the use of informant testimony in all death penalty 
cases was proposed by a Texas legislator, but was not enacted.  See 
Brandi Grissom, Bill Would Restrict Informant Testimony in Death 
Cases, TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://www.texastribune.org/2012/11/28/bill-would-restrict-informant-
testimony-death-case/. 
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false snitch testimony attests.  Commentators have urged adoption of 
a variety of additional measures intended to bolster the ability of 
courts to screen such testimony for reliability, but on closer 
examination, none of these suggestions—while on their own terms 
marginally helpful—sufficiently mitigates the high risk that false 
jailhouse snitch testimony will be admitted and have a material 
impact on jury deliberations. 
The only effective solution is to flatly preclude the use of such 
testimony.  The constitutional infrastructure already exists to permit 
courts to move in this direction.  The Supreme Court’s longstanding 
preclusion of coerced confession evidence provides a precedent readily 
applicable to confession evidence provided by jailhouse snitches.  But 
in all likelihood, if change in this area comes, it will be as a result of 
legislative resolve to take meaningful steps to reduce wrongful 
convictions.  There is a mature body of research data that identifies 
the primary causes of wrongful convictions.  Jailhouse snitch 
testimony is at the top of the list.  It is low fruit, waiting to be picked. 
